I think repositories only hold value if the storage and retrieval of information can be validated to be trusted, secure, reliable, and honest in its representations. We agree with Brian's statement. Within the *Institutional Web of Trust Repository* institutions will be authenticated by established certificate authorities. The major certificate authorities have high level processes for institutional authentication and security; these processes have established a record of reliability over many years. Institutions will have a vested interest in maintaining the validity of their certificates within the *Institutional Web of Trust Repository*. Since trust is an intangible value, I find it to be an unobtainable goal in ecommerce activities based on concepts that are not managed in accordance with good policies or even their own statements. IMHO any system that is self-managed is quite frankly a disaster and provides me as an informed consumer no level of trust or assurances proclaimed by any system or solution said to be good for goodness sakes. Self managed is equivalent to saying trust me because I say so. It is certainly our goal to have good policies. Assuming that processes of self-management can not be incorporated into good policies is a fallacious line of reasoning (http://www.opifexphoenix.com/reasoning/fallacies/slipperyslope.htm). Simply because a system involves self-management does not mean the system will inevitably end in disaster. From the user standpoint, the self-management aspect of our system is very slight. When a user activates his/her NFC enabled smart phone there will be a registration process where the user's legal identity and public key will be registered with the *Institutional Web of Trust Repository*. This process will be transparent to the user. There really is no way for certificate authorities or governments to manage the issuance and assurance of billions of private/public keys. A process in which users can self-register their own keys enables a workable world wide system. However, after reading Brian's response I can see that the term "self-management" is tinged with unreliability. We will remove this term from our presentation and replace it with "self-registered". I also don't understand why it is referred to as a "centralized" repository and then it is explained to be a "group" of repositories. Maybe it is just me, but isn't that a "distributed" model? Good point. That is clearly a mistake in our presentation. It is very likely each nation or groups of nations (EEC) will have its own central repository (replicated geographically). World wide, it will be a distributed model. Also, how do you ensure the individual is always in control of their key? I think that statement is simply not true, grandiose, and terrible misleading -- and not a basis of building any trust; as no system could ever ensure that the action of all its individuals was consistent and the same. Currently, there is a great deal of controversy regarding the security of data on mobile devices. Once the Trusted Platform Module (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module) is instituted on mobile devices this controversy should abate. Of course, a user's cell phone which contains their digital wallet may be lost or stolen just as physical wallet can be lost or stolen. The *Institutional Web of Trust Repository *will have processes for canceling and reestablishing credentials. I think the International [Institutional] Web of Trust is a trap of old concepts, proclaiming protections that are perceived based on biased assessments, and one of the most frightening concepts for ensuring trust and identities that I have listened to in quite awhile. These statements are frighteningly hyperbolic and uniformed. If I go to my local bank and in the process of provisioning my digital debit card onto my cell phone ~ the banking system calculates a hash value of the credential ~ then that hash value is encrypted with my private key ~ then encrypted again with the banks private key ~ then the dual encrypted value is stored *Institutional Web of Trust Repository *that value represents an institutional validation of the my identity (without storing any private information about the user). The weight of multiple institutional validations makes the user's identity more trustworthy. When a user presents a credential from his/her digital wallet a transaction ID will be sent from the authenticating system to the user's digital wallet, be encrypted with the user's private key and sent back to the authenticating system. The user can be authenticated by decrypting the transaction ID with the user's public key from the *Institutional Web of Trust Repository*. The credential can be authenticated by calculating the hash value of the credential and then decrypting the hash value stored in the *Institutional Web of Trust Repository* with the institution's public key and the user's public key. *All in all, this is really a very simple system based on existing technologies.* The key nuance is that we store institutional validations, we do not store private data. Best regards, Michael Duffy CEO / CTO ~ The Trust Nexus http://www.thetrustnexus.com Brian Dilley wrote:

Actually, I find that a "web" is a tangled mesh in which to entrap and is a term that infringes on other trademarks and is a symbol that doesn't inspire trust at all -- said the fly to the spider. I think repositories only hold value if the storage and retrieval of information can be validated to be trusted, secure, reliable, and honest in its representations. Since trust is an intangible value, I find it to be an unobtainable goal in ecommerce activities based on concepts that are not managed in accordance with good policies or even their own statements. IMHO any system that is self-managed is quite frankly a disaster and provides me as an informed consumer no level of trust or assurances proclaimed by any system or solution said to be good for goodness sakes. Self managed is equivalent to saying trust me because I say so.

Also, the wallet idea has come and gone and a second showing will most likely result in the same...I also don't understand why it is referred to as a "centralized" repository and then it is explained to be a "group" of repositories. Maybe it is just me, but isn't that a "distributed" model? Also, how do you ensure the individual is always in control of their key? I think that statement is simply not true, grandiose, and terrible misleading -- and not a basis of building any trust; as no system could ever ensure that the action of all its individuals was consistent and the same. Therefore, the International Web of Trust is seriously flawed by allowing such an assumption to be the core value of its model.

I really think this whole message has been completely self-promoting and quite a story about X.509 certificates but vaguely disguised as a wallet, and I think the International Web of Trust is a trap of old concepts, proclaiming protections that are perceived based on biased assessments, and one of the most frightening concepts for ensuring trust and identities that I have listened to in quite awhile.

This is exactly why such organizations as IETF, ANSI, ISO, AICPA, NIST and Kantara are so much in need to prevent such flawed solutions as this "web of trust" from being accepted by the electronic commerce community.

/_(My corporate cell phone number has been changed, if you could please update your records that would be great.)_/

Sincerely,

Brian

Brian Dilley CISA / CIPP / CGEIT

President

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*From:* community-bounces@kantarainitiative.org [mailto:community-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] *On Behalf Of *Michael Duffy *Sent:* Saturday, January 30, 2010 12:49 PM *To:* Joni Brennan *Cc:* community@kantarainitiative.org *Subject:* Re: [Kantara - Community] Institutional Web of Trust

As requested, we have voided all company references and provided a brief summary. Again, we apologize for the inappropriate post.

Here is an overview of the *Institutional Web of Trust* concept:

************************************************************** Executive Summary:* For the purpose of securing identity, rather than creating a centralized directory or multiple directories of private information, it will be far better to create a central repository containing a collection of institutional decisions which will establish an *Institutional Web of Trust*. In essence, there are a *limited number of institutions worldwide* (measured in thousands) that truly matter when it comes to legitimizing identity. Digital wallets on smart phones will enable the efficient association of unique public/private keys to a specific legal identity (legal name and legal address). If there is a non-unique association, an inconsistency arises in the system. If the association is unique and verified by one or more legitimate institutions an individual's identity is secure (as long as the private key which he/she controls is secure).

This system secures identity, protects individual privacy and prevents the establishment of monolithic government control. Under this system, the user is always in control of his/her credentials.

This system makes a simplified and efficient federation process possible. An institution could *federate the identity* of it's users (or a subset of its users) simply by adding (or modifying) a credential to each of it's user's digital wallet and creating an institutional reference within *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository*.

This system provides *the "Holy Grail" for single sign on*. ************************************************************* * Digital credentials on NFC enabled smart phones will soon transform the world of identity management. *Within three years there will be corporate and government deployments where all members of the organization are issued NFC enabled smart phones for the purpose of identity management.

The basic question is, how can trust be established in the digital age? If you and I have never met and I come to your website or place of business, how can you be confident that I am who I say that I am? *The Institutional Web of Trust will resolve this basic question regarding the establishment of trust.*

A key component of the infrastructure will be an easy to use *digital wallet* where credentials can be securely provisioned and transactions occur smoothly. This digital wallet will be the *cornerstone of NFC technologies on mobile devices* and provide the interface for identity, marketing and financial services. *Every aspect of digital life that depends on identity and transactions will flow through the digital wallet. *

This identity infrastructure will eliminate the possibility of identity theft for all participants, protect consumers and financial institutions from fraudulent transactions, greatly reduce cyber-crime and solve many of the systemic problems of the current Public Key Infrastructure system, especially the problems of certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and on-line status checking.

The solution is simple, practical and transparent to the consumer. Consumer acceptance will be rapid and widespread. The solution secures identity, protects individual privacy and prevents the establishment of monolithic government control. Under this system, the user is always in control of his/her credentials.

The essence of the approach is very different from the "Big Brother" approach recently announced by India. Rather than creating a centralized directory of private information, there will be a central repository containing a collection of institutional decisions which will establish an *Institutional Web of Trust*.

Compared to a decentralized web of trust which creates a web of individuals with, "the expectation that anyone receiving [a list of signatures] will trust at least one or two of the signatures", we will create a system where *trusted institutions legitimize individual identity*. Additionally, the *Institutional Web of Trust* will have centralized controller processes that rely greatly on self-management and automation resulting in great efficiencies.

Digital wallets on NFC enabled smart phones will enable users to secure their private keys and control/present their digital credentials. Because a user's identity will be authenticated by the processes of *The Institutional Web of Trust* (not a trust authority) there is no need for a trust authority to issue and vouch for public/private keys for individual users. It is only necessary that the public key be registered and the private key be secured. Users can self-issue their keys.

*The Institutional Web of Trust* does not secure identity by, "making personal data harder to steal". Rather, identity is secured by self-managing logical inconsistencies within the system, resolving identity conflicts and preventing fraudulent transactions.

As Bruce Schneier, author and security guru, pointed out, "Proposed [identity theft] fixes tend to concentrate on the first issue--making personal data harder to steal--whereas the real problem is the second [preventing fraudulent transactions]. If we're ever going to manage the risks and effects of electronic impersonation [identity theft], *we must concentrate on preventing and detecting fraudulent transactions*." [Solving Identity Theft]

In essence, there are a *limited number of institutions worldwide* (measured in thousands) that truly matter when it comes to legitimizing identity. Digital wallets on smart phones will enable the efficient association of unique public/private keys to a specific legal identity (legal name and legal address). If there is a non-unique association, an inconsistency arises in the system. If the association is unique and verified by one or more legitimate institutions an individual's identity is secure (as long as the private key which he/she controls is secure).

In the process of adding a credential to a user's digital wallet, the provisioning institution (government agency, bank, university, etc.) will calculate a secure hash value (numerical representation) of the credential combined with information from the user's *primary credential* (legal identity). This hash value will be encrypted with the user's private key and then encrypted again with the provisioning institution's private key; this encrypted hash value will then be stored in *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository* representing *an institutional validation of the user's identity.*

This dual encryption establishes that the credential was associated with the user during the provisioning process rather than simply asserting the association by a reference from the repository. Also, There is no need to store any specific information (account number, balance, etc.) about user's account. The user is in complete control of the information he/she presents and his/her privacy is maintained.

When a user presents a credential from his/her digital wallet a transaction ID will be sent from the authenticating system to the user's digital wallet, be encrypted with the user's private key and sent back to the authenticating system. The user can be authenticated by decrypting the transaction ID with the user's public key from *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository*. The credential can be authenticated by calculating the hash value of the credential and then decrypting the hash value stored in *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository* with the institution's public key and the user's public key.

In a variation of this process the provisioning institution does not store the encrypted hash value in *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository*; rather, the provisioning institution itself maintains a repository and a reference to the repository is authenticated by an entry contained within *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository* (through the institution's primary credential). In this way an institution could *federate the identity* of it's users (or a subset of its users) simply by adding (or modifying) a credential to each of it's user's digital wallets and creating an institutional reference within *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository*.

As part of the federation process, cooperating institutions will most likely create standard authorization levels for various services and provision these levels as part of a user's credential. For example, a coalition of universities may have authorization levels for library services that will enable users to access any library within the coalition; government organizations may provision security levels within a user's credential that enable inter-agency access to resources; etc.

There is significant debate regarding the effectiveness of biometrics in identity management. When a user is not present (authenticating over a network) there are fatal problems with biometric authentication. Most significantly, "The main security problem with biometrics is the inability to create a new secret. If you allow your fingerprint to be digitized and sent across a network or scanned by a compromised scanner, it can be stolen. Then someone has a digital copy of your fingerprint."

Even if a method of biometric identification proved to be completely reliable, security issues would still remain. There would be opportunities to steal someone's biometric signature and forge their identity credentials, especially if there was a massive store of private personal data; one successful attack could essentially render the entire system ineffective.

When a user is present bio-metric data can be an effective authenticator. It will be possible to *store bio-metric data within a user's credential* (not within a central repository) when the credential is created by the provisioning institution. When a user presents the credential, verifying the biometric data in the credential against the individual in real time will provide enhanced security along with verifying the encrypted transaction code against the user's public key and verifying the encrypted hash code of the credential against the value stored in *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository*.

While there are many types of biometric identifiers, one of the simplest and most usable is a photograph of the human face verified by a human being. Any credential in a user's digital wallet that includes a photograph (driver's license, passport, bank debit card, etc.) will be highly reliable when a user presents the credential in person.

Why would a major institution (bank, university, corporation, government agency, etc.) utilize *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository* instead of its own internal system? When there is no need for an external third party to rely on a user's credential an institution may very well utilize its own internal repository. In this same case, smaller institutions, for reasons of convenience and cost, might still utilize *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository*.

Whenever a third party (a party other than the provisioning institution) must relay on a user's credential, the key services *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository* provides are assurance that the user is unique and trustworthy, assurance that the provisioning institution is unique and trustworthy and assurance that the credential is trustworthy. Also, *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository* creates a "*data synergy effect*" which establishes an *Institutional Web of Trust* (when multiple institutions validate a unique user's identity the identity becomes more secure and trustworthy).

If a unique user has digital credentials for a state driver's license, a passport, a bank debit card, a university ID, insurance cards, credit cards, etc., all independently validated by trustworthy institutions, that user's identity is secure and highly trustworthy. Similar to credit ratings, both individuals and institutions will have "*trust ratings*" within *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository*. A centralized notification service will also be provided when credentials are lost or stolen.

The uniqueness test for legal identities within *The Institutional Web of Trust Repository* helps to secure identity and prevent identity theft. If there is a non-unique association, an inconsistency arises in the system. Also, easy access for online status checking establishes the currency of a user's credentials in case the user's digital wallet is lost or stolen.

Additionally, the system provides *the "Holy Grail" for single sign on*. All computers will soon have an interface (USB plugin or internal card) that will enable NFC interactions with mobile devices. The digital wallet on a user's cell phone will be provisioned with credentials containing specified authorizations for different systems and services. Rather than logging into a directory or utilizing a complex federated identity process, a user will log onto his/her cell phone with a PIN and/or a voice authentication signature. The user (or the authenticating system) will then select the appropriate credential for the specified system or service with no need to enter another user name or password (the user's private key will be used to encrypt a transaction ID). This approach also *solves the "Keys to the Kingdom" problem* where a single sign on to a directory service opens access to all the user's systems and services.

Additionally, the system will enable a process of *mutual authentication* that will prevent phishing scams. The user's credential and the institution's credential could both contain a list of valid URLs which could be matched during the sign on process.

Existing providers of identity management services should not see *The Institutional Web of Trust* as a competitor; rather, they should see it as an infrastructure service (similar to the electric power grid that has hundreds of energy providers).

This identity infrastructure will be created with government resources and be managed to a great extent as a public trust.

Best regards,

Michael Duffy CEO / CTO ~ The Trust Nexus http://www.thetrustnexus.com

Joni Brennan wrote:

Thanks Mike,

It seems like you have a product and you're telling us about it. We don't allow these types of messages here. So you have a few choices of how to interact.

1 - Parse your email down to a very brief idea and some questions that the group could respond to. (This mode is more aligned with the true nature of the list.) Again - as it reads now it's a product advertisement which is *prohibited. * 2 - Browse our groups list from the homepage here http://kantarainitiative.org. You may find a group you could join and then share your idea there.

3 - Start your own Work or Discussion Group to discuss your identity based solutions ideas. If you're interested in this path please ping me directly so we can discuss and I can learn more about your goals.

...

From there I could help you to determine if this is appropriate work material for Kantara or not.

Cheers - Joni

On Fri, Jan 29, 2010 at 10:04 AM, Michael Duffy <thetrustnexus@austin.rr.com <mailto:thetrustnexus@austin.rr.com>> wrote:

My apologies.

A member of your group actually suggested we post to the community list.

Our goal was not to promote the company but to discuss the ideas related to an Institutional Web of Trust with the leading experts in the field of identity.

Is there another existing list that would better suit this purpose?

If not, perhaps Kantara could create such a list (e.g., ideas@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:ideas@kantarainitiative.org>).

Mike

Roger Sullivan wrote:

Let me echo Brett's sentiments.

None of Kantara's lists are to be used for promotion of oneself or one's company.

Please refrain from doing that.

Roger Sullivan President, Kantara Initiative

-----Original Message----- From: Brett McDowell [mailto:email@brettmcdowell.com] Sent: Friday, January 29, 2010 11:04 AM To: Thomas Hardjono Cc: community@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:community@kantarainitiative.org> Subject: Re: [Kantara - Community] Institutional Web of Trust

That is certainly not its intent and if it becomes used in that way I fear we will see mass un-subscription which will undermine our ability to communicate with each other. So I would ask that all subscribers refrain from using this list for any form of advertising.

Thank you,

|| Brett McDowell, Executive Director, Kantara Initiative

On Fri, Jan 29, 2010 at 10:59 AM, Thomas Hardjono <standards@hardjono.net> <mailto:standards@hardjono.net> wrote:

...

My apologies for asking this trivial question,

but is this Kantara mailing-list allowed to be

used for "advertising" emails?

Regards.

/thomas/

__________________________________________

Thomas Hardjono

MIT Kerberos Consortium

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

77 Massachusetts Ave W92-152

Cambridge, MA 02139

email: hardjono[at]mit.edu <http://mit.edu>

web: http://www.kerberos.org

mobile: +1 781-729-9559

desk: +1 617-715-2451

__________________________________________

From: community-bounces@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:community-bounces@kantarainitiative.org> [mailto:community-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] On Behalf Of Michael Duffy Sent: Friday, January 29, 2010 8:47 AM To: community@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:community@kantarainitiative.org> Subject: [Kantara - Community] Institutional Web of Trust

We believe we have THE solution that will realize the vision of the Kantara Initiative: Ensure secure, identity-based, online interactions while preventing misuse of personal information so that networks will become privacy protecting and more natively trustworthy environments.

We realize that is a bold statement. We humbly ask the members of the Kantara Initiative to review our approach:

Digital credentials on NFC enabled smart phones will soon transform the world of identity management.

The Trust Nexus is a startup company located in Austin, TX. We hold intellectual property rights that will enable us to build the infrastructure for secure identity in the digital age. Whoever controls the infrastructure for secure identity will also play a leading role in the emerging world of m-Commerce.

The basic question is, how can trust be established in the digital age? If you and I have never met and I come to your website or place of business, how can you be confident that I am who I say that I am? The Trust Nexus answers this basic question regarding the establishment of trust.

A key component of our infrastructure will be an easy to use digital wallet where credentials can be securely provisioned and transactions occur smoothly. This digital wallet will be the cornerstone of NFC technologies on mobile devices and provide the interface for identity, marketing and financial services. Every aspect of digital life that depends on identity and transactions will flow through the digital wallet.

The digital wallet on NFC enabled smart phones will be one of the most valuable assets in the digital age. The digital wallet and supporting infrastructure will be based on industry standards that will enable the mobile network operators (MNOs) to meter services that flow through their networks and participate in new marketing/advertising models.

The identity infrastructure we have designed will eliminate the possibility of identity theft for all participants, protect consumers and financial institutions from fraudulent transactions, greatly reduce cyber-crime and solve many of the systemic problems of the current Public Key Infrastructure system, especially the problems of certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and on-line status checking.

Our solution is simple, practical and transparent to the consumer. Consumer acceptance will be rapid and widespread. Our solution secures identity, protects individual privacy and prevents the establishment of monolithic government control. Under our system, the user is always in control of his/her credentials.

The essence of our approach is very different from the "Big Brother" approach recently announced by India. Rather than creating a centralized directory of private information, we will create a central repository containing a collection of institutional decisions which will establish an Institutional Web of Trust.

Compared to a decentralized web of trust which creates a web of individuals with, "the expectation that anyone receiving [a list of signatures] will trust at least one or two of the signatures", we will create a system where trusted institutions legitimize individual identity. Additionally, the Institutional Web of Trust established by The Trust Nexus will have centralized controller processes that rely greatly on self-management and automation resulting in great efficiencies.

Digital wallets on NFC enabled smart phones will enable users to secure their private keys and control/present their digital credentials. Because a user's identity will be authenticated by the processes of The Trust Nexus (not a trust authority) there is no need for a trust authority to issue and vouch for public/private keys for individual users. It is only necessary that the public key be registered and the private key be secured. Users can self-issue their keys.

The Trust Nexus does not secure identity by, "making personal data harder to steal". Rather, identity is secured by self-managing logical inconsistencies within the system, resolving identity conflicts and preventing fraudulent transactions.

As Bruce Schneier, author and security guru, pointed out, "Proposed [identity theft] fixes tend to concentrate on the first issue--making personal data harder to steal--whereas the real problem is the second [preventing fraudulent transactions]. If we're ever going to manage the risks and effects of electronic impersonation [identity theft], we must concentrate on preventing and detecting fraudulent transactions." [Solving Identity Theft]

In essence, there are a limited number of institutions worldwide (measured in thousands) that truly matter when it comes to legitimizing identity. Digital wallets on smart phones will enable the efficient association of unique public/private keys to a specific legal identity (legal name and legal address). If there is a non-unique association, an inconsistency arises in the system. If the association is unique and verified by one or more legitimate institutions an individual's identity is secure (as long as the private key which he/she controls is secure).

In the process of adding a credential to a user's digital wallet, the provisioning institution (government agency, bank, university, etc.) will calculate a secure hash value (numerical representation) of the credential combined with information from the user's primary credential (legal identity). This hash value will be encrypted with the user's private key and then encrypted again with the provisioning institution's private key; this encrypted hash value will then be stored in The Trust Nexus Repository representing an institutional validation of the user's identity.

This dual encryption establishes that the credential was associated with the user during the provisioning process rather than simply asserting the association by a reference from the repository. Also, There is no need to store any specific information (account number, balance, etc.) about user's account. The user is in complete control of the information he/she presents and his/her privacy is maintained.

When a user presents a credential from his/her digital wallet a transaction ID will be sent from the authenticating system to the user's digital wallet, be encrypted with the user's private key and sent back to the authenticating system. The user can be authenticated by decrypting the transaction ID with the user's public key from The Trust Nexus Repository. The credential can be authenticated by calculating the hash value of the credential and then decrypting the hash value stored in The Trust Nexus Repository with the institution's public key and the user's public key.

In a variation of this process the provisioning institution does not store the encrypted hash value in The Trust Nexus Repository; rather, the provisioning institution itself maintains a repository and a reference to the repository is authenticated by an entry contained within The Trust Nexus Repository (through the institution's primary credential). In this way an institution could federate the identity of it's users (or a subset of its users) simply by adding (or modifying) a credential to each of it's user's digital wallets and creating an institutional reference within The Trust Nexus Repository.

As part of the federation process, cooperating institutions will most likely create standard authorization levels for various services and provision these levels as part of a user's credential. For example, a coalition of universities may have authorization levels for library services that will enable users to access any library within the coalition; government organizations may provision security levels within a user's credential that enable inter-agency access to resources; etc.

There is significant debate regarding the effectiveness of biometrics in identity management. When a user is not present (authenticating over a network) there are fatal problems with biometric authentication. Most significantly, "The main security problem with biometrics is the inability to create a new secret. If you allow your fingerprint to be digitized and sent across a network or scanned by a compromised scanner, it can be stolen. Then someone has a digital copy of your fingerprint."

Even if a method of biometric identification proved to be completely reliable, security issues would still remain. There would be opportunities to steal someone's biometric signature and forge their identity credentials, especially if there was a massive store of private personal data; one successful attack could essentially render the entire system ineffective.

When a user is present bio-metric data can be an effective authenticator. It will be possible to store bio-metric data within a user's credential (not within a central repository) when the credential is created by the provisioning institution. When a user presents the credential verifying the biometric data in the credential against the individual in real time will provide enhanced security along with verifying the encrypted transaction code against the user's public key in The Trust Nexus Repository and verifying the encrypted hash code of the credential against The Trust Nexus Repository.

While there are many types of biometric identifiers, one of the simplest and most usable is a photograph of the human face verified by a human being. Any credential in a user's digital wallet that includes a photograph (driver's license, passport, bank debit card, etc.) will be highly reliable when a user presents the credential in person.

Why would a major institution (bank, university, corporation, government agency, etc.) utilize The Trust Nexus Repository instead of its own internal system? When there is no need for an external third party to rely on a user's credential an institution may very well utilize its own internal repository. In this same case, smaller institutions, for reasons of convenience and cost, might still utilize The Trust Nexus Repository.

Whenever a third party (a party other than the provisioning institution) must relay on a user's credential, the key services The Trust Nexus Repository provides are assurance that the user is unique and trustworthy, assurance that the provisioning institution is unique and trustworthy and assurance that the credential is trustworthy. Also, The Trust Nexus Repository creates a "data synergy effect" which establishes an Institutional Web of Trust (when multiple institutions validate a unique user's identity the identity becomes more secure and trustworthy).

If a unique user has digital credentials for a state driver's license, a passport, a bank debit card, a university ID, insurance cards, credit cards, etc., all independently validated by trustworthy institutions, that user's identity is secure and highly trustworthy. Similar to credit ratings, both individuals and institutions will have "trust ratings" within The Trust Nexus Repository. A centralized notification service will also be provided when credentials are lost or stolen.

The uniqueness test for legal identities within The Trust Nexus Repository helps to secure identity and prevent identity theft. If there is a non-unique association, an inconsistency arises in the system. Also, easy access for online status checking establishes the currency of a user's credentials in case the user's digital wallet is lost or stolen. And most importantly, The Trust Nexus creates a "data synergy effect" which establishes an Institutional Web of Trust.

Additionally, our system provides the "Holy Grail" for single sign on. All computers will soon have an interface (USB plugin or internal card) that will enable NFC interactions with mobile devices. The digital wallet on a user's cell phone will be provisioned with credentials containing specified authorizations different systems and services. Rather than logging into a directory or utilizing a complex federated identity process, a user will log onto his/her cell phone with a PIN and a voice authentication signature. The user (or the authenticating system) will then select the appropriate credential for the specified system or service with no need to enter another user name or password (the user's private key will be used to encrypt a transaction ID). This approach also solves the "Keys to the Kingdom" problem where a single sign on to a directory service opens access to all the user's systems and services.

We are confident we have a transforming technology and a clear vision of the future. No one has found a conceptual flaw in the system. Existing providers of identity management services should not see The Trust Nexus as a competitor; rather, they should see us as an infrastructure provider (similar to the electric power grid that has hundreds of energy providers).

Best regards,

Michael Duffy CEO / CTO ~ The Trust Nexus http://www.thetrustnexus.com

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_______________________________________________ Community mailing list Community@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:Community@kantarainitiative.org> http://kantarainitiative.org/mailman/listinfo/community _______________________________________________ Community mailing list Community@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:Community@kantarainitiative.org> http://kantarainitiative.org/mailman/listinfo/community

_______________________________________________ Community mailing list Community@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:Community@kantarainitiative.org> http://kantarainitiative.org/mailman/listinfo/community

-- Joni Brennan IEEE-ISTO Kantara Initiative Program Director voice:+1 732-226-4223 email: joni @ ieee-isto.org <http://ieee-isto.org> gtalk: jonibrennan skype: upon request

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