Bob
Some interesting thoughts ..(moreso if one had decided to use smartcard technology).
FWIW, the emerging view from our program down in this little country is that end user/citizen folks want to carry another card around like a hole in the head. It would be different if we already had a sizable penetration of smartcards but we don't. However, we see many more possibilities with the ubiquitous mobile device. Those possibilities are dashed right now because the things that make identity work are hardwired into the OS with really, let's face it, no security. And, a bit like the browser vendors, I guess there is no incentive/pressure on them to change, and understandably the unit price would go up.
But wouldn't it be great to have a *separated* secure standardised TPM for things that customers carry round with them whatever they were… Bill, our lead architect uses an example of a phone, with all its usual stuff on one side and the TPM module on the back. We heard that Iron Key are going the TPM-type way, so that seems to line up with Bob's reference below. And this is getting close to our notion. But still, you want the USB to also do its usual storage functions and more too, right?
Cheers
Colin
From: Bob Pinheiro [mailto:kantara@bobpinheiro.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 5:43 p.m.
To: John Bradley
Cc: Colin Wallis; dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara
Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models
OK, but it's still possible to use certificates for strong authentication of consumers if the certificate is contained on a USB smartcard token. Of course, relying parties must accept certificates for consumer authentication. Maybe there is a chicken-and-egg problem here: RPs may have little interest until someone shows them a strong authentication solution using certificates and smartcards that is economically viable for adoption and use by consumers. But will smartcard vendors devote resources to this until they see a consumer market?
The
Smart Card Alliance is a member of Kantara, and is also interested in getting smartcard technology into the hands of consumers. The Smart Card Alliance is represented on the Consumer Identity WG because they were hoping to get some insight into consumer interest in, and adoption of, smartcards. Unfortunately, that kind of insight doesn't exist within the Kantara community. At least not within CIWG. Yet the Smart Card Alliance has an
Identity Council, so there ought to be some opportunities for collaboration between Kantara and Smart Card Alliance. There are at least two areas where our interests probably overlap: use of smartcards for access to patient health records, and smartcards as form factors for identity credentials usable within the "ecosystem" enabled by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace.
Another Kantara member is Fraunhofer FOKUS, which is the host of the next Kantara meeting, and is also a provider (?) of German eID cards. And although there seems to be no formal working relationships between Kantara and Microsoft, smartcards were used to provide secure U-Prove tokens for an RSA demo by splitting the token's private key between the user's computing device and the smartcard.
So there seems to be a number of areas of where certificates and smartcards can be used for strong authentication and/or high assurance claims. If these topics are of sufficient interest within Kantara, and resources can be found, perhaps there are opportunities for collaboration with Smart Card Alliance and others.
Bob P.
On 3/14/2011 6:25 PM, John Bradley wrote:
Colin,
I spent many years with the PKI Forum and other places pushing the better browser support rock up the hill to no great success.
There has been no detectable improvement in mutual TLS support. On the other hand EV certs got in because there was a clear revenue model to the PKI Forum participants.
Some of the problem relates to TLS itself and the rest with the browser venders.
If I had to get one thing from them it would be a way to do ephemeral keys for HoK as STORK and others have been asking for, also to no great success.
If someone wants to put together a gang to take on the browser venders I am in, but I am realistic about any real progress after 10 years or so of trying.
John B.
On 2011-03-14, at 5:56 PM, Colin Wallis wrote:
So the problem with client side Certs is the way they are implemented..with security in mind only, not privacy. 'Promiscuous' is the label given to them down here..
That's why the NZ Government does not use them in its consumer online service strategy…
And I might point out that it's too much of a generalisation for my comfort to say to that 'eGov prefers PKI' (Rainer's 5th bullet)
The lines between law enforcement/security (with no privacy) and consumer service/security (with privacy) seem to be getting blurred in some folks' minds (certainly not Bob's, nor John's..)
<<BP: For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates>>
Maybe, but I think it won't be listened to. The change has got to take place at the doors (hearts and minds) of the browser vendors, and the logical co-ordination point for that is the CA Browser forum. I'm trying to think of the directional pressure that might persuade them to tackle this problem - the Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners group? Maybe. Kantara? Nope. At least not unless KI is pushing at an open door..
Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI:
For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication?
Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2.
U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out.
Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers.
For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates?
A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove.
Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission?
Thanks
Bob P.
On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote:
I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic.
I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however.
On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote:
John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like
- PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA
- To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed
- Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other.
I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion?
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