December 2016 - DG-BSC - mailman.kantarainitiative.org

Book Review
by John Wunderlich 02 Jan '17

02 Jan '17

For your holiday reading pleasure. This might be of interest to the Legal UMA group and some on the BSC DG. It's a review <http://www.rogerwhitson.net/?p=3501>of Benjamin Bratton’s The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty <https://www.amazon.ca/Stack-Software-Sovereignty-Studies-ebook/dp/B01D1Q44HE> John Wunderlich, BA, MBA IAPP Fellow of Information Privacy CISA, CIPM, CIPP/C, PbD Ambassador @PrivacyCDN <https://twitter.com/PrivacyCDN> & Privacist -- This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify the system manager. This message contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this e-mail. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail if you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail from your system. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.

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Results from this week's editing sessions
by Eve Maler 22 Dec '16

22 Dec '16

Thomas and I want to thank Kathleen for joining today's editing session. We have been working in a *new GDoc version of the report* because of problems with the Confluence wiki version; that's probably better all around anyway. You can find that version *here* <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1HOVJ3lKqOIjwCqPt5jFxfLr7wEoJ0ZVNbMGsdsW…>. This should give you view access; those with writing assignments can request edit access. Our current plan is to extend our meeting schedule (which nominally should have ended on January 5, six months to the day after our first meeting) by a month so that we can press ahead and complete our report. If you're so inclined, *please take a look at the draft report* -- particularly the outline, which is what we concentrated on during this week -- in preparation for our *Tuesday, January 3* meeting. We wish you all *happy holidays and a wonderful new year*! Your co-chairs :-) *Eve Maler*ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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FYI, ad hoc editing session *won't* be taking place at our typical call time tomorrow (Tuesday)
by Eve Maler 19 Dec '16

19 Dec '16

Thomas and I had advertised an opportunity for folks to listen in to our editing session to take place at our regular Tuesday call time tomorrow, but we've had to move it to much later in the day. If we make good progress, we will publish it for feedback prior to our Thursday editing session. Sorry for the disruption of previously laid plans! *Eve Maler*ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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Notes from BSC telecon Thursday, December 15
by Eve Maler 15 Dec '16

15 Dec '16

*Please note:* Though we will hold ad hoc report editing meetings next Tuesday and Thursday (Dec 20 and 22) at the usual location, which others are welcome to join, these are not formal DG meetings and we don't expect normal group attendance. There will be no meetings at all on Dec 27 and 29. We'll sort out our DG timeline and roadmap in more detail in January. Merry Christmas, Happy Holidays, and Happy New Year to all! ==== http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/2016-12+%28December+201… Agenda: - Craft scenarios that aim to maximally empower a person (possibly choosing one or more of those that appear in these notes, but try not to be too UMA-specific!), and work on setting forth the requirements for DLT- and other-related technologies that they'd have to meet Attending: Eve, Thomas, Kathleen, Susan What does "empowered" actually mean? Eve points to her "user-centric" criteria as one way to get sharper-edged (see below). What scenarios should we collect? Thinking of financial transactions (since Thomas has been hanging out with FIs ), that should include getting "universal access" to data, even if (say) it's jointly owned, as in joint accounts. But it's more than data; it's actual transacting, as in payments and buying stuff. Also, online apps should ask for only what's needed, and there should be a sort of "Good Housekeeping seal" she can trust. Think of Uber and what it knows and shares. There's helping Alice make a decision about clinical trials and to what purposes her health data is put. Genomic data is a case of data that's both "jointly owned" and not deidentifiable. (BTW, research isn't covered by HIPAA.) Suggestion: We need to a) define empowerment, b) select final scenarios, c) assess specific technologies, not very broad ones, and then d) ultimately make observations and even compare them before e) writing recommendations. There is sentiment for using the "user-centric" materials to start to define empowerment. Let's dig up that other "blockchain identity" technology that's certificate-related from our notes. That should be one of the technologies we assess, along with Sovrin, UMA, Opal, and (what else? other stuff in our outline, etc.). No *official* meetings next week or for the rest of the year. Thomas and Eve and whoever else cares to join will have ad hoc meetings during our normal slots. Eve will ask KI stuff to remove the official calendar entries, but we'll advertise the opportunities appropriately. *Eve Maler*ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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Notes from BSC telecon Tuesday, December 13
by Eve Maler 13 Dec '16

13 Dec '16

http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/2016-12+%28December+201… Agenda: - Report work and recommendations Attending: Eve, Matisse, Thomas, Susan, John W, Colin, Kathleen Symbiont spoke at the NAIC conference yesterday about identities (corporate exclusively?) and smart contracts. This relates to beneficial ownership. We appear to be on the cusp of this being figured out because of the pressure from corporations, at least. So it may behoove us to make recommendations about natural-person identity work regarding several efforts, e.g. several WGs in Kantara. Susan also attended the Smart Contract Alliance event this past week, where there were three regulatory agencies represented, speaking about how things might work for them. Personal identities are going matter to them, but they have no concept of this – they just know about KYC (Know Your Customer) in a regulatory sense. "If you want universality, it must be imposed by some external standard. If you want autonomy, you must recognize individual choice. These two are in some sense antithetical." If something like Sovrin is widely adopted, Eve suspects its uses would devolve to KYC-type use cases. We could essay some of these principles (and oxymorons?) in our intro. There are no silver bullets in "self-sovereign identity". Microsoft announced that Dan Buckner is forming a unit around something similar. Thomas notes: It's all about the data, and who has control over it. Is it considered a joint asset or not? A concept called the LLP – Limited Liability Persona – used to be floated (by Bob Blakley? Burton Group folks, at any rate). Some banks do seem interested in giving their individual customers control over releasing their own KYC data in personal data store-like fashion, DLT or no. In terms of the logical choices of where to store a person's PII: - *Traditionally:* Attributes have been stored in something like a directory server, more "voluminous" records (e.g. EHRs) might be stored in something like a CMS, and other databases such as RDBMSes might be used for other personal data. Organizations in charge of collecting and generating this data are by regulation, profit motive, and custom responsible for managing its security and data protection. - *With DLTs in the picture:* Other options become available: - *Public ledger:*Conventional wisdom has already formed, it seems, that you don't put PII on a public ledger. The reasons are: bloat, distributedness, and consumer management of private keys. The two other options given this are: - Pointers from the public ledger to other traditional server-side storage (a la Blockstack, in presumably most implementations?) - Pointers from the public ledger to client-side storage (a la Sovrin) - *Private ledger:* This can be secured by any traditional means, so it doesn't suffer from the weaknesses of the public ledger approach. AI: Eve and Thomas: Put the above text in the draft report. There's an interesting challenge with allowing people to *control access/permissioning* as the primary goal vs. allowing people to *control personal data* as the primary goal. Client devices are generally not meant to be running all the time (e.g. to serve relevant data), whereas a transaction (such as making a payment) generally requires that a service be up and running. Imagining that a person's mobile device is a storageless UMA authorization server that can access what it needs in the cloud and makes a callback, would that work if a requesting party Bob tries to access Alice's resource? *Next time:* Craft scenarios that aim to maximally empower a person (possibly choosing one or more of those that appear in these notes <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/2016-11+%28November+201…>, but try not to be too UMA-specific!), and work on setting forth the requirements for DLT- and other-related technologies that they'd have to meet in order to meet our DG's goals for transactional empowerment of individuals. *Eve Maler*ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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Fwd: Questionnaire for the Sovrin Foundation for the BSC report
by Eve Maler 13 Dec '16

13 Dec '16

Latest sets of answers on Sovrin, after Thomas and I sent followup questions. See answers from both Andy Tobin and Drummond Reed. *Eve Maler*ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Andrew Tobin <andrew.tobin(a)evernym.com> Date: Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 1:35 PM Subject: Re: Questionnaire for the Sovrin Foundation for the BSC report To: =Drummond Reed <drummond.reed(a)evernym.com>, Eve Maler < eve.maler(a)forgerock.com>, Phil Windley <phil(a)windley.org> Cc: Thomas Hardjono <hardjono(a)mit.edu> Hi Eve - great questions. I'll chuck in a few additional answers but can't put them inline as my email client is uncooperative. - Correlation. Phil has nailed this. Pairwise identifiers for each relationship means that correlation/collusion is minimised. Obviously if you reveal to a relying party three proofs of name and address from three different providers, they will be able to see your relationship with those three providers (a bit like taking 3 physical name/address utility bills to a bank for example). But there's no way they'll be able to correlate these with a different relationship you have with an online betting company for example. - Right to be forgotten/deleted. This is a really interesting one which is quite easy/obvious when you think about it. You won't be storing personal info on Sovrin - you'll keep it in a vault off-ledger. So if you want to delete it, just delete it. Even better, you'll have a record of every organisation/person that you shared info with (via link contracts or consent receipts) which will be anchored to Sovrin. You can then submit "delete" requests to those orgs, with the original consent receipt as proof that they have your info. You can then, if you wish, audit those orgs to confirm that they have complied with your request (this audit/check is nothing to do with Sovrin other than using Sovrin to prove that you shared data with them in the first place and asked them to delete it). - Data controllership. I'll assume you mean something along the lines of whether the issuer of a claim (like a driving license authority) has any control over that claim once it has been issued. The answer is that they can revoke it if they wish. A driving license is an interesting example. If I get banned for drinking & driving, it's only my entitlement to drive that is revoked. My name, address and DoB stays the same. Sovrin revocable anonymous verifiable claims allows the issuer to revoke one aspect of a claim (entitlement to drive), leaving the other attributes alone, anonymously i.e. Nobody can ping some sort of revocation list to see if your license is revoked - only you can enable them to do this when you provide proof of that claim. Once the issuer has given you the claim, it's yours, aside from the revocation piece. A relying party may elect to demand proof of address less than 3 months old for example. If your proof of address is 6 months old, you'd be able to re-request that proof from your issuer and get another more recent one - you can do this as you have a relationship with that issuer already and they know who you are (via pairwise distributed identifiers that they issued the original claim to you with, and only you can re-request that claim). - Non-individual entities. Sovrin handles identifiers for people, organisations and things. Every entity has one or more DIDs on Sovrin. An organisation like a bank may just have one DID. Within that DID is a DID Descriptor Object (DDO) which contains details that the DID owner is happy to make public (e.g. Public key). A bank would probably want to add their name, address, and reputation information to their DID so it is possible for all to see it. No need for any other system - the DID is a superb way to handle flexibility across different types of identity. The beauty of it is that Sovrin enables a totally distributed way of handling public keys and identifiers with no need for a central authority, so anyone/anything can have one or more DIDs. The latest DID spec is here and is worth a read: https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/rebooting-the- web-of-trust-fall2016/commit/6e8b0c36b178ac2c643ebdea5c15f10074d12aee - IDPs. IDPs can still be IDPs. In fact I'd say that they are vital to any identity ecosystem. What Sovrin can do is massively increase the portability of an ID proof that an IDP creates. By writing the proof to the individual's Sovrin identity, that individual can then use it anywhere they want. If you look at GOV.UK Verify for example, or eIDAS, the valuable thing is the fact that the IDP has proven your data to LoA2 under the UK Government's proofing policy. At the moment, that proof is only usable in a very small ecosystem. To expand that ecosystem you need to add lots more orgs to the hub that the UK govt has built, bringing issues around unacceptable correlation & collusion. Plus the problems of scaling up a fairly rigid hub model. Plus the problem of adding a new identity transaction (e.g. proof you are a doctor) to that hub, which could take months/years. With Sovrin, there's no hub so you get massive scalability and the flexibility to add new data/claim types at will with no dependency on anything else. So for GOV.UK Verify, it would be very interesting if the IDPs wrote their users' proofs to their Sovrin IDs (and/or acted as the initial trust anchors to sponsor those individuals onto Sovrin), which at a stroke would increase the usability of Verify many-fold with no new hubs etc. Hope that helps! Andy Andy Tobin Managing Director, Europe Evernym andrew.tobin(a)evernym.com +44 7710 761829 <+44%207710%20761829> On Tue, 29 Nov 2016 at 21:36, Phil Windley <phil(a)windley.org> wrote: > Thanks Eve. > > I’m looping in Andy Tobin and Drummond Reed. I’ll put a few answers below, > but they will probably have other, better ones. :) > > > > On Nov 26, 2016, at 3:22 PM, Eve Maler <eve.maler(a)forgerock.com> wrote: > > Hey Phil! Hope you're doing well. Cc'ing Thomas here... Based on BSC group > discussion over the past few weeks, and reviewing the Sovrin materials, > Thomas and I put together a few followup questions on Sovrin for you and > Andy. Thanks very much in advance for any thoughts in response... > > > - In the Sovrin vision, how is the challenge of big data inferences > and data fusion seen -- that is, the effects of correlatability in the face > of sharing small amounts of data (sometimes just behavioral)? > > > Sovrin doesn’t address the correlation of data except where that data is > identity data specifically linked in Sovrin. Sovrin allows identity owners > to create unique DID (digital identifiers) for each relationship to avoid > correlation via those identifiers. Of course, of the identity owner then > shares a mobile number with two orgs, they can correlate with that. That is > outside the scope of Sovrin. > > > > - How would “right to erasure”/”right to be forgotten” requirements be > managed? > > > Identity owners typically interact with Agencies, organizations that > provide identity services to identity owners, run policy engines on their > behalf, etc. They would have a right to be forgotten in so far as those > agencies had jurisdiction in countries that required it and had identifying > data on them (account information). > > Data written to the ledger itself is not erasable. It can be revoked, but > the original data on the ledger remains. However, as a general rule, the > data written to the ledger is not personal identifying. Best practice is to > write that into an appropriate data store and reference it from the ledger. > So, deleting it where it lives would delete the data but not necessarily a > record that it existed. > > > - Thinking of IdPs “becoming identity proofers”, Is it correct to say > that a former IdP would become a Sovrin steward in an issuer role and would > do proofing as part of provisioning, or is there some further role for > former IdPs? > > > Not necessarily a Steward. There will be relatively few Stewards (around > 100). Stewards run the nodes the record transactions on the ledger. A > separate Agency function provides DID issuance services, policy services, > and identity data management. One of the purposes of an Agency (see The > Inevitable Rise of Self-Sovereign Identity) is to provide storage for > off-chain assets. > > https://www.sovrin.org/The%20Inevitable%20Rise%20of% > 20Self-Sovereign%20Identity.pdf > > > > - Is there a notion of “data controllership” (the privacy concept), > where an online service has an interest in and accountability for the data? > How does this fit with plans for the forthcoming Sovrin Steward Agreement, > regarding both issuers and readers? > > > Drummond? Andy? > > > - Is it anticipated that the Sovrin economic model (and/or something > else) protects against reputation and trust anchors being susceptible to a > Sybil attack? > > > This is an active area of discussion. Drummond has an entire Google Doc he > can share. > > > - If there’s some rival but similar identity ecosystem with its own > issuers and readers, would the ecosystems have some way to interoperate? > > > Yes, that’s the point of Digital Identifiers (DID’s) and DID Descriptor > Objects. Drummond probably has more here. > > > - What about storing data about, and controlling access to, > non-individual identities, such as smart things, enterprises, or > applications? Would those just use different systems? > > > Sovrin is designed to be used by individuals and organizations to manage > identities for themselves and all the things they care about. There’s no > reason Sovrin couldn’t be used for the IoT, but those identifiers and > associated data would belong to the person who owns the things. Identity > owners (people and organizations) can create as many DIDs as they need to > for whatever purposes they have. > > > > > *Eve Maler*ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging > Technology > Cell +1 425.345.6756 <(425)%20345-6756> | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: > @xmlgrrl > > On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 5:04 PM, Phil Windley <phil(a)windley.org> wrote: > > Cool. Appreciate the opportunity to contribute. If you need attribution, > that was from Andrew Tobin. > > Have fun this week. Talk soon. > > > > > > On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 5:42 PM -0600, "Eve Maler" < > eve.maler(a)forgerock.com> wrote: > > Belated ack/thanks for this! I'm going to send it to our DG for question > and comment as we work through it. What we publish may be a combination of > quoted sections, paraphrases, commentary, and so on, and since we do our > work in the open anyway, of course we'll invite and welcome comment back on > the draft. > > > *Eve Maler*ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging > Technology > Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl > > *The ForgeRock Identity Summit* is coming to > <http://summits.forgerock.com/> *Paris in November!* > > On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 8:30 AM, Phil Windley <phil(a)windley.org> wrote: > > Here’s some answers to the questionnaire. Let me know if something doesn’t > make sense or needs more explanation. > > > *Deficits and benefits of how the problem space was/is being solved* > > The Internet was built without a standard, explicit way of identifying > people or organisations. So websites simply began offering their own local > accounts with usernames and passwords, and this has been the predominant > solution ever since. > > But the Internet has expanded hugely, and people use more and more > services daily. This silo-based approach, where users must maintain > identities for every site they interact with, has become untenable. It is > not just a usability disaster for individuals, it also creates a multitude > of data honeypots for hackers—the breach of which compromises trust in all > Internet services. > > To solve this problem we have tried to connect different identity silos > together in various federated models. However these have produced > inadvertent side effects such as concentrating control around a small > number of providers, correlation of personal data through multiple > seemingly unrelated transactions, increasing data leakage through > inadvertent sharing, and raising privacy concerns, all while not actually > giving the individual real control. At the same time, there is a growing > economic inefficiency when organisations all around the world have to > collect, store and protect the same sort of personal data in their own > silos. It is reaching a tipping point. > > The next evolution of the Internet will be the creation of a common > identity layer that allows people, organisations and things to have their > own self-sovereign identity—a digital identity they own and control, and > which cannot be taken away from them. Self-sovereign identity is the > natural evolution of an ecosystem which has moved faster than its > supporting capabilities. > > *Proposed benefits of the new solution space* > > To create the long-missing identity layer of the Internet, a new, trusted > infrastructure is required which enables identity owners to share not only > identity, but also verified attributes about people, organizations and > things, with full permission and consent. > > > For identities to be truly self-sovereign, this infrastructure needs to > reside in an environment of diffuse trust, not belonging to or controlled > by any single organisation or even a small group of organisations. Nobody > can “turn the lights out”. Distributed ledger technology (DLT) is the > breakthrough that makes this possible. It enables multiple institutions, > organisations and governments to work together for the first time by > forming a decentralised network much like the Internet itself, where data > is replicated in multiple locations to be resistant to faults and tampering. > > When combined with distributed key management and peer-to-peer sharing of > encrypted claims, DLT is what finally makes self-sovereign identity > possible. Within this identity layer, mechanisms for discovery, routing of > requests, secure exchange of information and management of consent, under > the full control of the identity owner, finally becomes possible. > > The Sovrin Identity Network has been design specifically to deliver a > globally scalable self-sovereign identity solution. But to be truly > self-sovereign, it cannot be owned by anyone. Similarly, to be fully > trusted, and to avoid the pitfalls of other initiatives in the distributed > ledger space, Sovrin needs a lightweight governance layer. To achieve this, > the developers of Sovrin have given away the source code to the Sovrin > Foundation, a not-for-profit organisation whose role is to provide a thin > layer of governance to Sovrin while not owning or managing any > infrastructure. The Sovrin Foundation ensures the effective distribution of > the decentralised network and ensures that the network itself functions in > the best interest of its users. > > *Different approaches being taken in the new solution space, e.g. if other > approaches are being taken outside of Sovrin* > > Early examples of identity solutions using distributed ledger technology > used ledgers built for other purposes such as the Bitcoin ledger, or > general purpose ledgers such as Ethereum. While these capabilities are able > to provide fairly simple proofs that something took place on a certain date > & time, they are not dedicated to the particular nuances of the identity > ecosystem such as non-correlation, revocation and anonymous zero-knowledge > proofs. > > They also lack governance. For example, the need to secure the network by > using hashing power has resulted in a concentration of Bitcoin mining in > China. Who are these miners, do we trust them, do they jointly exert too > much influence. What governance is in place? The recent forking of Ethereum > has also shown the consequences of a lack of governance and direction. > > Sovrin is the first public-permissioned distributed ledger. It is publicly > accessible by anyone, but in order to run one of the nodes which validates > the integrity of the network, you need to be permitted to and you must > abide by certain rules which include the Sovrin Trust Framework. > > > Non-distributed ledger solutions are attempting to paper over the problems > with silo-based identity. Examples are federated identity models such as > the gov.ukVerify system, which uses attribute sharing hubs and identity > providers to move information from one silo to another, but without giving > the identity owner real control. Personal information management solutions > are going a step further, in enabling identity owner control of their data, > but are still somewhat lacking in portability and therefore remain as silos. > > > *Strengths, weaknesses, risks, and open issues being seen in practice* > > The ability for an identity owner to assert multiple verifiable claims > about their identity, anonymously if required, and without possibility of > correlation, is central to the architecture of Sovrin. With discovery > capabilities to ensure that party A can confirm the identity of party B, > and vice versa, direct party-to-party data sharing can take place with no > need for intermediaries and with full evidence of consent. > > By replacing intermediaries with protocols, immediate digital identity > verification can take place with no 3rd party involvement. There are too > many benefits to list, bur here are a few that we are working on: instant > employment screening; frictionless bank KYC, identity for the stateless, > fast online checkout, globally portable digital identity for travellers, > and vaccination recording for developing countries. > > Challenges to adoption of Sovrin are those typical of a two-sided market. > Both identity issuers and relying parties need to come on board. Sovrin > partners are taking a simple approach to this – the initial partners will > be both issuers and relying parties. They will provide new identity > services for their users to be utilised within their own ecosystem. These > islands of functionality will expand and intersect with other islands, and > individuals will find that they can use their identity information from one > issuer with a completely different relying party. In other cases, > coalitions of organisations which are all trying to solve the same problem > are coming together to create an ecosystem where they can all use Sovrin to > their mutual benefit. > > The other major challenge is an educational one. Trying to explain > self-sovereign identity to a layman is difficult. Because people have been > brought up to understand that the only way the internet works is to give > their details to many different organisations repeatedly, they cannot > conceive of a better way. Being able to get across the power of every > individual having their own digital identity which they control and own and > which cannot be taken away, is a new concept which needs to be communicated > effectively. > > *Whether other technologies and techniques are being brought to bear (you > can see a list of technologies and techniques we are analyzing in > our report > <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/Report+from+the+Blockch…> TOC)* > > Sovrin enables/uses the following > - Public-permissioned distributed ledger technology based on the > Plenum Consensus Protocol, involving multiple specialised legers (identity > ledger, config ledger etc) > - Verifiable claims > - Anonymous credentials > - Revocation, anonymous if required > - Distributed and cryptographic identifiers > - Link contracts & consent receipting > - Persistent P2P messaging endpoints > - Key discovery, management recovery & rotation > - Portable off-ledger private data storage e.g. IPFS/BigChainDB > etc. > - Identity, relationship and reputation graphs > - 3rd party attested and self-attested claims > > > > On Oct 11, 2016, at 9:41 AM, Eve Maler <eve.maler(a)forgerock.com> wrote: > > Hi Phil-- Thanks for being willing to help the Blockchain and Smart > Contracts group understand what Sovrin is doing in the context of our > analysis efforts! > > If you look at the first paragraph of our draft report's introduction > <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/Report+from+the+Blockch…>, > you'll see a statement of our scope: > > - Solving use cases for *empowering traditionally disempowered parties* > (such as individuals) > - taking part in *transactions* (such as entering into contracts and > information-sharing agreements) > - with *parties that traditionally hold greater power* (such as > companies and large countries) > - in the context of *decentralization technologies and techniques* > (such as blockchain and smart contracts) > - and their mixture with *identity* (both in the course of conducting > business/legal transactions and to solve digital identity use cases). > > Our Discussion Group is time-boxed to six months, and so we plan to go > into only as much depth as can be covered in this time frame. (We started > in July!) > > With all of this in mind, could you please comment on the following > aspects of Sovin? > > - Deficits and benefits of how the problem space was/is being solved > - Proposed benefits of the new solution space > - Different approaches being taken in the new solution space, e.g. if > other approaches are being taken outside of Sovrin > - Strengths, weaknesses, risks, and open issues being seen in practice > - Whether other technologies and techniques are being brought to bear > (you can see a list of technologies and techniques we are analyzing in our > report > <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/Report+from+the+Blockch…> > TOC) > > Many thanks! If you have any questions, or would like to discuss responses > in a phone call, don't hesitate to let me know. > > > *Eve Maler*ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging > Technology > Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl > *ForgeRock Summits* are coming to <http://summits.forgerock.com/> *London > and Paris!* > > >

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User-centric identity materials
by Eve Maler 08 Dec '16

08 Dec '16

As promised... Here are my slides <https://www.dropbox.com/s/wwxgzpykhq0ja2n/2016Q4-GartnerIAM-UserCentricIden…> from the presentation this week, my 2008 slides <https://www.dropbox.com/s/ahsy3eusmdto3pb/Maler-NZIDConf-Apr2008.pdf?dl=0>, and the accompanying journal paper <https://www.dropbox.com/s/fcl0txic8mtrr8k/Maler-NZIDConf-Apr2008-paper-Jan0…> . *Eve Maler*ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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Notes from BSC telecon Thursday, December 1 (no mtgs next week; please write your assignments!)
by Eve Maler 01 Dec '16

01 Dec '16

http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/2016-12+%28December+201… Agenda: - Discuss end-stage recommendations Attending: Thomas, Eve, John W, Susan Susan attended the Wall St. Blockchain event, which had a lot on smart contract standards. Cook County had announced a land records project, but that didn't have a wide enough scope. Illinois has now announced something. So this suggests needing guidance. At banking conferences, there's an assumption that banks can/should serve as IdPs, but then there's the unbanked. OTOH, in the actual identity world, in some countries, this has "been solved" through legislation where governments either do or don't contract with banks to provide IdP services. The IdP value prop hasn't seemed to look that great in the last 15 years so far for banks. (We also note that R3 is losing members...) Should we try and provide recommendations around the societal/political implications, or just technical? (See the Traveling Salesman movie <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1801123/> for a good take, and the paper The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work <http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/moral-fn.pdf>.) Our use cases do already have societal, social, and cultural implications. Is this about autonomy, or consent? Let's not hassle this out here! See the new paper A Typology of Privacy <https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=9030060290200640671120041250770…> if you want to go all Socratic. Eve shared her recent talk on where user-centric identity went wrong (link forthcoming) and how to improve such technology. The "sharper-edged criteria", most of them from 2008, could be useful in pressing for assessing empowerment of people in transacting. The notion of fostering more "peer-like" relationships in a metaphorical sense is behind the criteria: 1. Does the solution make the right thing to do be the easiest thing to do? 2. Does the solution enable unilateral user actions that have unambiguously positive outcomes? 3. Does the solution make what people actually want to do possible? 4. Does the solution respect and balance all ecosystem parties’ needs? 5. Does the solution make consent more meaningful? 6. Is the system’s architecture applicable to multiple or future problems in a clean way? What is the definition of *self-sovereign*, actually? Phil W has mentioned that he considers UMA to be a self-sovereign technology, interestingly. Is the definition "I get to host it (what?) where I want to host it"? Or is it "I get to move it (what?) whenever I want/to wherever I want"? Or simply "I have high (significantly higher than before) leverage/negotiating power with the other side"? Is that last one a definition of being able to act as a (metaphorical) *peer*? Do we need more criteria, or more crisp criteria? *AI:* Eve: Provide the rest of the information backing up her user-centric/self-sovereign analysis, and also distribute the newest Sovrin answers to followup questions posed by Eve. *AI:* John W: Next week, take a look at Eve's materials and his own "broken"-themed blog post and essay definitions. *No meetings next week; let's all write our assigned pieces instead!* *Eve Maler*ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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Graphic to attempt to capture what James was saying
by John Wunderlich 30 Nov '16

30 Nov '16

[image: Inline images 1] Sincerely, John Wunderlich @PrivacyCDN <https://twitter.com/PrivacyCDN> Call: +1 (647) 669-4749 eMail: john(a)wunderlich.ca -- This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify the system manager. This message contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this e-mail. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail if you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail from your system. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.

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