Thomas;

This aligns well with Canadian privacy views of a 'biographical core' and the social reality that we all have many identities that we present to the world. When I read this and note the piece that I just posted about the potential conflict between the GDPR 'right to erasure' and Blockchain, I think you have correctly identified a normative inverse relationship  between "Core Identity" attributes what should be written openly to a blockchain. Exciting work.

John Wunderlich,

Sent frum a mobile device,
Pleez 4give speling erurz

"...a world of near-total surveillance and endless record-keeping is likely to be one with less liberty, less experimentation, and certainly far less joy..." A. Michael Froomkin




On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 12:23 AM -0400, "Thomas Hardjono" <hardjono@mit.edu> wrote:

Folks,

This may or may not be a use-case proper for BSC-DG, but I thought I'd mention it here because its an "infrastructure" technology that supports scaling of blockchains. (analogy:  DNS is not part of Internet routing in TCP/IP, but it sure does help us use the Internet).

One of the key concepts we (at MIT) are trying to develop further in CoreID (diagram is here http://www.findthomas.net/blog/). Part of it is the idea of a new kind of identity provider called the "persona provider" (PP)

The Persona Provider could be implemented as a combination of an UMA Authorization Server combined with an UMA Resource Server. (PP = AS + RS).

When Alice creates an account at the Persona Provider (PP), she convinces the PP initially that she is legit by supplying the PP with signed assertions (blinded assertion) which the Core Identity Issuer (upstream) has created.

When Alice needs to transact on the blockchain using an anonymous-verifiable identity, she goes to her account at the PP and self-generates a transaction-identity (transaction-identifier) to be used on the blockchain or within a smart contract. She can self-generate as many transaction-identifiers as she needs -- no limit.  The PP provides the crypto-tools to do this (just like bitcoin-wallets / client softwares or PGP).

At the same time, she could optionally set policy on the account, treating the the blinded assertions (from the Core Identity Issuer) as resources.  The transaction identities (which are anonymous-verifiable strings) can also be treated as resources sitting on the PP.

The PP keeps these transaction-identifiers as long as she needs, and may even archive them.  

The PP also makes available a Identity Verification end-point (API) that allows the counter-party (RP) -- or anyone for that matter -- to verify a transaction-identifier found on a blockchain or in a smart-contract.


If this is useful, I can write it up for the use-cases page.

/thomas/
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