Please disregard my earlier e-mail. My PC crashed while I
was writing the e-mail and I didn’t even realize that it had been sent
until Dervla replied.
Our next conference call is scheduled for June 08, 9-10:30
PDT.
Agenda:
Call In Details
Skype: +9900827044630912
US Dial-In: +1-201-793-9022
Room Code: 4630912
Fyi, Paul Madsen and his group are hosting an AuthZ workshop
at Burton Catalyst Tuesday, July 27, 12-2:30pm
As I understand it, they will be looking at trends in
standards associated with AuthZ, and they are interested in use cases that may
require extension or modification to them.
We could help the group by submitting some of our more
interesting examples for their consideration, prior to the workshop. In other
words, John and I would appreciate any UC examples you care to submit to our website:
http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/ias/Home
This is, tentatively,
the workshop’s objective:
As
authorization generally follows authentication in a given online
From my own experience in the financial sector, there are
some very challenging use cases coming out of new thinking about dynamic
authentication/authorization across multiple channels eg. Online, ABM/ATMs,
IVR, contact centres. That is, authorization levels are modulated by risk
calculations that use input parameters such as customer assurance index levels,
channel the request comes through, self-imposed preferences (e.g. I don’t
want to allow money transfers over my online banking), and even the location of
the channel device. And how are we to manage such authorizations with
respect to banking products/applications? Is it efficient to build dynamic entitlements
on, say, a security token basis? Or is it better for policy to help determine a
kind of filter (a filter of entitlements to app services) that would be
enforced in the mid-tier between the channel and the back-end product? Some of
our major applications have extremely high transaction rates – can security
tokens with their complex protocols operate in such an environment?
Another thing to consider is that, while the term ‘adaptive
authentication’ is common, adaptive authorization isn’t. In fact,
once an initial authentication occurs over a channel, subsequent AuthZ events,
triggered by a customer trying to do something, are highly inter-related with AuthN.
For one thing, a high assurance (at registration time, because of his or her
bona fides submitted to the bank) customer initially authenticating with strong
credentials should get a wider set of entitlements than if that customer had a
lower assurance index. We are in the process of figuring out how to design such
a matrix.
WG-IAS
mailing list
WG-IAS@kantarainitiative.org
http://kantarainitiative.org/mailman/listinfo/wg-ias
Gavin
Illingworth
Telephone:
416.513.5652
E-mail:
gavin.illingworth@bmo.com