December 2024 - DG-DeepfakesIDV - mailman.kantarainitiative.org

Final Meeting
by Jay Meier 17 Dec '24

17 Dec '24

Hello everyone. I hope you are all well. We will have a final Kantara DeepFake DG meeting tomorrow. I expect it'll be a “wrap it up” kinda meeting, dotting i’s and crossing t’s and applying polish. One small item is to zero in on “what’s next”. Wednesday: Join The Zoom Meeting <https://us06web.zoom.us/j/86156446139?pwd=NVZJcVFOZmc3a1NWS0J6SURmc1VKUT09> Meeting ID: 861 5644 6139 Passcode: 808675 Meeting coordinates TIMES: 12:00PM Eastern Time on Wednesdays Add the group calendar to your personal calendar. <https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ical/c_fd984e780e396aa17f933c5bf938fb4…> (meeting is pinned to Eastern Time for Daylight Saving Time shifts - use the Time zone converter <https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/converter.html?iso=20230831T160000&p…> tool to convert to other time zones) Jay Meier Senior Vice President - North American Operations jay(a)facetec.com | 612-978-3687 www.FaceTec.com <http://www.facetec.com/> | www.Liveness.com <http://www.liveness.com/> | www.SpoofBounty.com <http://www.spoofbounty.com/> Confidentiality Notice: This message is intended only for the use of the Addressee and may contain information that is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination of this communication is strictly prohibited. Please erase all copies of the message and its attachments.

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No Meeting tomorrow
by Jay Meier 12 Dec '24

12 Dec '24

Hey gang. Sorry for the tardy agenda email. My weeks all messed up with conferences and travel. We’ll just cancel tomorrows meeting and cross T’s and dot i’s next week. Were almost done! J Jay Meier Senior Vice President - North American Operations jay(a)facetec.com | 612-978-3687 www.FaceTec.com <http://www.facetec.com/> | www.Liveness.com <http://www.liveness.com/> | www.SpoofBounty.com <http://www.spoofbounty.com/> Confidentiality Notice: This message is intended only for the use of the Addressee and may contain information that is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination of this communication is strictly prohibited. Please erase all copies of the message and its attachments.

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Final tasks for Deepfakes/IDV Group
by Andrew Hughes 11 Dec '24

11 Dec '24

As we discussed on today's call: - *Maxine has posted the "Final Draft" version of the deck on the wiki* https://kantara.atlassian.net/wiki/download/attachments/744030213/Kantara%2… - Please review and point out errors and small fixes - the deck above is considered 'Final v1.0' - We are starting a "parking lot" of items that will go into the next revision of this deck - that's where comments about enhancements and additions will go - Take a deep look at the 2 recommendations slides - Can you "see yourself" in one or more of them? Meaning: over the next 12 months, will your work directly rest on / incorporate any of the recommendations? - If not, can you create a recommendation that does? (keeping in mind that the recommendation has to be aligned with the group content) - Keep in mind that we, the group members, are the first and most important consumers of this material - you should be able to see yourself using this material in your regular work. *The final call of the year will be December 18, 2024.* - We will ask each of you which recommendation you "see yourself" in. - We should have consensus that the deck is 'done' and ready for consumption (barring last minute editorial fixes). - We will discuss ongoing maintenance of the wiki and ppt - how frequently and by whom. - We will discuss potential groups that spin out from this discussion group Thank you all for your lively discussions and great contributions! andrew. (on behalf of the Deepfakes/IDV leadership team) *Andrew Hughes *CISM mobile/signal +1 250.888.9474 AndrewHughes3000(a)gmail.com *https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrew-hughes-682058a <https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrew-hughes-682058a>*

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FINAL PP
by maxine most 11 Dec '24

11 Dec '24

This is the final PP. Please do not provide any additional comments. There is one piece that needs to be added on Slide 17. Someone added Physical Camera Swap and we need a description we can sort this out today, * Common AI-Deepfake Injection techniques include: * Virtual Camera Injection: Using software to create a virtual camera that directly feeds pre-recorded or synthetic video into the biometric system. * Physical Camera Swap: * Device Emulation: Emulating a mobile device to manipulate the system calls and inject fraudulent biometric data. * Function Hooking: Altering the flow of system calls to replace legitimate biometric data with fraudulent data. * Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks: Intercepting and altering the data stream between the biometric sensor and the processing system. If someone else wants to make additional modifications, they can. I will upload it to the wiki. C. Maxine Most Principal, Acuity Market Intelligence +1 720 530 5836 640 W. Linden St, Louisville, CO 80027, USA www.acuitymi.com [signature_1405495346]<https://www.linkedin.com/in/maxinemost/> [A close up of a logo Description automatically generated] <https://twitter.com/cmaxmost> [signature_3923117784]

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Updated Deck for tommorrow's meeting
by maxine most 11 Dec '24

11 Dec '24

I have done my best to integrate all feedback. If something has been missed apologies, lots of balls in the air this week. C. Maxine Most Principal, Acuity Market Intelligence +1 720 530 5836 640 W. Linden St, Louisville, CO 80027, USA www.acuitymi.com [signature_1118319711]<https://www.linkedin.com/in/maxinemost/> [A close up of a logo Description automatically generated] <https://twitter.com/cmaxmost> [signature_2681908536]

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Re: Deck Update
by Alastair Treharne 10 Dec '24

10 Dec '24

Hiya Maxine, We've drafted some suggested definitions below. Thanks, Alastair Presentation attack detection - PAD ISO 30107 PAD definition is - “automated discrimination between bona-fide presentations and biometric presentation attacks.” A presentation attack is a deliberate attempt to mimic an individual's biometric characteristic at the biometric sensor. Biometric data can be obtained directly from a person, online, or through existing databases and then used to create artefacts to mount an attack on a biometric system. Artefacts can be physical or digital objects. The presentation of a biometric artefact (e.g. a facial image,video or deepfake of a person; or a gelatin fingerprint overlay) to a biometric sensor can be detected by methods broadly referred to as presentation attack detection (PAD). Independent PAD testing assesses how effective a system is in detecting presentation attack attempts. Liveness ISO 30107 liveness detection definition is - measurement and analysis of anatomical characteristics or involuntary or voluntary reactions in order to determine whether a biometric sample is being captured from a living subject present at the point of capture ISO notes that - “Liveness detection methods are a subset of presentation attack detection methods.” The Biometric Institute liveness definition is - The specific detection of whether a sensor is viewing a live biometric – as opposed to a recording, picture, or another non-living spoof – is commonly known as liveness.” ---- Alastair Treharne Co-founder Ingenium Biometric Laboratories Mobile: +44 77959 70950 Email: alastair.treharne(a)ingeniumbiometrics.com <alastairthrenar.treharne(a)beruku.com> Web: www. <http://www.beruku.com/>ingeniumbiometrics.com <http://www.ingeniumbiometrics.com/> > > > On Mon, 9 Dec 2024 at 00:46, maxine most <cmaxmost(a)acuity-mi.com> wrote: > >> Thanks for your recommendations, suggestions, edits, etc. >> >> I have tried to incorporate everything that was sent to me. If I missed >> something or did not accurately represent your comments and feedback, >> please let me know. >> >> >> >> *We are still missing:* >> >> - Slide 2 – Executive Summary >> - Slide 9- Definitions of Liveness and PAD >> - Slide 11 – any feedback on the DF Spectrum >> >> >> >> We should wrap this up at our Wednesday meeting and all enjoy the >> holidays. (-: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *C. Maxine Most* >> >> Principal, *Acuity Market Intelligence* >> >> +1 720 530 5836 >> >> 640 W. Linden St, Louisville, CO 80027, USA >> >> www.acuitymi.com >> >> [image: signature_2479070133] <https://www.linkedin.com/in/maxinemost/> >> [image: A close up of a logo Description automatically generated] >> <https://twitter.com/cmaxmost> >> >> [image: signature_2142046500] >> _______________________________________________ >> A Community Group mailing list of KantaraInitiative.org >> DG-DeepfakesIDV mailing list -- dg-deepfakesidv(a)kantarainitiative.org >> To unsubscribe send an email to staff(a)kantarainitiative.org >> List archives -- >> https://mailman.kantarainitiative.org/hyperkitty/list/dg-deepfakesidv@kanta… >> ______ >> Group wiki -- https://kantara.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/DFDG/overview >> >> > > -- > Alastair Treharne > Co-founder > Beruku Identity > > Mobile: +44 77959 70950 > Skype: Treharne.Alastair > Email: alastair.treharne(a)beruku.com > <alastairthrenar.treharne(a)beruku.com> > Web: www.beruku.com >

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Deck Update
by maxine most 09 Dec '24

09 Dec '24

Thanks for your recommendations, suggestions, edits, etc. I have tried to incorporate everything that was sent to me. If I missed something or did not accurately represent your comments and feedback, please let me know. We are still missing: * Slide 2 – Executive Summary * Slide 9- Definitions of Liveness and PAD * Slide 11 – any feedback on the DF Spectrum We should wrap this up at our Wednesday meeting and all enjoy the holidays. (-: C. Maxine Most Principal, Acuity Market Intelligence +1 720 530 5836 640 W. Linden St, Louisville, CO 80027, USA www.acuitymi.com [signature_2479070133]<https://www.linkedin.com/in/maxinemost/> [A close up of a logo Description automatically generated] <https://twitter.com/cmaxmost> [signature_2142046500]

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Re: [WG-PEMC] Re: FW: Certificate usage
by Carol Buttle 06 Dec '24

06 Dec '24

Good point Tom. Feels like I have been trying the same for the longest time too. On Fri, Dec 6, 2024 at 7:02 PM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones(a)gmail.com> wrote: > I have been trying to enabled MTLS (that's what it's traditionally been > called) for at least 25 years. It's harder than it looks primarily because > the user won't tolerate it Perhaps with an AI user agent it will work. > That's where I am putting my effort today. > > thx ..Tom (mobile) > > On Fri, Dec 6, 2024, 10:51 AM Salvatore D'Agostino <sal(a)idmachines.com> > wrote: > >> Yes, interesting, passing along. Thanks Dan. >> >> >> >> Building on TLS 1.3 for client/server makes a lot of sense. >> >> >> >> Here is the technical article referenced in the blog post. >> >> >> >> 1063.pdf <https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1063.pdf> >> >> >> >> The record layer effectively uses a receipt. >> >> >> >> *From:* Daniel Schleifer <dan(a)idmachines.com> >> *Sent:* Friday, December 6, 2024 1:00 PM >> *To:* Salvatore D'Agostino <sal(a)idmachines.com> >> *Subject:* Certificate usage >> >> >> >> >> >> Hi Sal, >> >> I saw this article and thought it was interesting. >> >> https://brave.com/blog/distefano/ >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> A Community Group mailing list of KantaraInitiative.org >> Wg-pemc mailing list -- wg-pemc(a)kantarainitiative.org >> To unsubscribe send an email to staff(a)kantarainitiative.org >> List archives -- >> https://mailman.kantarainitiative.org/hyperkitty/list/wg-pemc@kantarainitia… >> ______ >> Group wiki -- https://kantara.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/Wg-pemc >> >> _______________________________________________ > A Community Group mailing list of KantaraInitiative.org > Wg-pemc mailing list -- wg-pemc(a)kantarainitiative.org > To unsubscribe send an email to staff(a)kantarainitiative.org > List archives -- > https://mailman.kantarainitiative.org/hyperkitty/list/wg-pemc@kantarainitia… > ______ > Group wiki -- https://kantara.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/Wg-pemc > >

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Re: [WG-PEMC] FW: Certificate usage
by Salvatore D'Agostino 06 Dec '24

06 Dec '24

0 *H÷ 010 `He0 *H÷ $ Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0429_01DB47E8.31F8B810" This is a multipart message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0429_01DB47E8.31F8B810 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Thanks Tom.. From: Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones(a)gmail.com> Sent: Friday, December 6, 2024 2:02 PM To: Salvatore D'Agostino <sal(a)idmachines.com> Cc: wg-ancr(a)kantarainitiative.org; pemc kantara <wg-pemc(a)kantarainitiative.org>; wg-riup <wg-riup(a)kantarainitiative.org>; dg-deepfakesidv(a)kantarainitiative.org Subject: Re: [WG-PEMC] FW: Certificate usage I have been trying to enabled MTLS (that's what it's traditionally been called) for at least 25 years. It's harder than it looks primarily because the user won't tolerate it Perhaps with an AI user agent it will work. That's where I am putting my effort today. thx ..Tom (mobile) On Fri, Dec 6, 2024, 10:51â¯AM Salvatore D'Agostino <sal(a)idmachines.com <mailto:sal@idmachines.com> > wrote: Yes, interesting, passing along. Thanks Dan. Building on TLS 1.3 for client/server makes a lot of sense. Here is the technical article referenced in the blog post. 1063.pdf <https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1063.pdf> The record layer effectively uses a receipt. From: Daniel Schleifer <dan(a)idmachines.com <mailto:dan@idmachines.com> > Sent: Friday, December 6, 2024 1:00 PM To: Salvatore D'Agostino <sal(a)idmachines.com <mailto:sal@idmachines.com> > Subject: Certificate usage Hi Sal, I saw this article and thought it was interesting. https://brave.com/blog/distefano/ _______________________________________________ A Community Group mailing list of KantaraInitiative.org Wg-pemc mailing list -- wg-pemc(a)kantarainitiative.org <mailto:wg-pemc@kantarainitiative.org> To unsubscribe send an email to staff(a)kantarainitiative.org <mailto:staff@kantarainitiative.org> List archives -- https://mailman.kantarainitiative.org/hyperkitty/list/wg-pemc@kantarainitia… ______ Group wiki -- https://kantara.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/Wg-pemc ------=_NextPart_000_0429_01DB47E8.31F8B810 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" = xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" = xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" = xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" = xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><meta = http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8"><meta = name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 15 (filtered = medium)"><style></style></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue = vlink=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap:break-word'><div = class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'>Thanks Tom..<o:p></o:p></span></p><p = class=3DMsoNormal><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div = style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in = 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span><= /b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> = Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones(a)gmail.com> <br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, = December 6, 2024 2:02 PM<br><b>To:</b> Salvatore D'Agostino = <sal(a)idmachines.com><br><b>Cc:</b> wg-ancr(a)kantarainitiative.org; = pemc kantara <wg-pemc(a)kantarainitiative.org>; wg-riup = <wg-riup(a)kantarainitiative.org>; = dg-deepfakesidv(a)kantarainitiative.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [WG-PEMC] = FW: Certificate usage<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><p = class=3DMsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I = have been trying to enabled MTLS (that's what it's traditionally been = called) for at least 25 years. It's harder than it looks primarily = because the user won't tolerate it  Perhaps with an AI user agent = it will work. That's where I am putting my effort = today.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p = class=3DMsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p = class=3DMsoNormal>thx ..Tom (mobile)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p = class=3DMsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On = Fri, Dec 6, 2024, 10:51<span = style=3D'font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>=E2=80=AF</span>AM Salvatore = D'Agostino <<a = href=3D"mailto:sal@idmachines.com">sal(a)idmachines.com</a>> = wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote = style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in = 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'>Yes, interesting, passing along. Thanks = Dan.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p = class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'>Building on TLS 1.3 for client/server makes a = lot of sense.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:aJuto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p = class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'>Here is the technical article referenced in = the blog post.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p = class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'><a = href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1063.pdf" = target=3D"_blank">1063.pdf</a></span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p = class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'>The record layer effectively uses a = receipt.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><div><div = style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in = 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><b><span = style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span><= /b><span style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> = Daniel Schleifer <<a href=3D"mailto:dan@idmachines.com" = target=3D"_blank">dan(a)idmachines.com</a>> <br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, = December 6, 2024 1:00 PM<br><b>To:</b> Salvatore D'Agostino <<a = href=3D"mailto:sal@idmachines.com" = target=3D"_blank">sal(a)idmachines.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> = Certificate usage</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p><= /o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p><= /o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Hi = Sal,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>I saw this = article and thought it was interesting.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p = class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><a = href=3D"https://brave.com/blog/distefano/" = target=3D"_blank">https://brave.com/blog/distefano/</a> <o:p></o:p><= /p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p><= /o:p></p></div><div><div = id=3D"m_9030748115635805817ms-outlook-mobile-signature"><div><p = class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p><= /o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal = style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>__________________________________________= _____<br>A Community Group mailing list of = KantaraInitiative.org<br>Wg-pemc mailing list -- <a = href=3D"mailto:wg-pemc@kantarainitiative.org" = target=3D"_blank">wg-pemc(a)kantarainitiative.org</a><br>To unsubscribe = send an email to <a href=3D"mailto:staff@kantarainitiative.org" = target=3D"_blank">staff(a)kantarainitiative.org</a><br>List archives = --  <a = href=3D"https://mailman.kantarainitiative.org/hyperkitty/list/wg-pemc@kan= tarainitiative.org/" = target=3D"_blank">https://mailman.kantarainitiative.org/hyperkitty/list/w= g-pemc(a)kantarainitiative.org/</a><br>______<br>Group wiki -- <a = href=3D"https://kantara.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/Wg-pemc" = target=3D"_blank">https://kantara.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/Wg-pemc</a><o= :p></o:p></p></blockquote></div></div></body></html> ------=_NextPart_000_0429_01DB47E8.31F8B810-- ü0`0H BE#ÈDµ0 *H÷ 0J10 UUS10U IdenTrust1'0%UIdenTrust Commercial Root CA 10 140116181223Z 340116181223Z0J10 UUS10U IdenTrust1'0%UIdenTrust Commercial Root CA 10"0 *H÷ 0 §PÞ?=Ô3FñoQa²©Og]ÙSÝ(Ù×ðÿ®Crùµ]|ÁBá1PtÑ |Í!«Câ¬^nó Z2œ¢ëùè\ ìÿÒ¯q³ŽSNïŒœìO20K^WÄSÂöÙb+¿$bßÃž)KIx<`"üÚ6ÈÂ¢Ô,Tg5ns¿Xð€Ýå°¢&zÊà6¥õý·ï®?@õmZýÎ4Ê$Üt#]3]Ä%ö0Ý]àÕGœŽë¡»IIØ[óä$äbOOÁ¯tšÑrjzIÌŽFyÆ±ÚYúu!eÝVÎû«¥`ÄùR°œù+# #v;÷3áÉóiùK¢àNŒ~9÷Dp~þZå±¬ÑÌò5åIIÊVÉ=û};ÁÂMÉO7é¡jßb.Ë5Qy,È%8ôúK§\Òã 9Jt|ÕYÂ?N\Rô=÷Rñê£¬ýI4(óA:îèÞÿ_ºËèò¹P`À1ÓsåïŸ í3tŸ ÄglðzUFN§ô>áöØ á3d+c×2^ùÀ{xoŒùxz×rtUtx±ºánpºO ºhÃ{ÿ1ðs==*±A þMeky3Ž×£B0@0Uÿ0Uÿ0ÿ0UíDÀÓðî€{ŸBç&TÈ6v0 *H÷ ®2öŠK|Dva'(Í^Tï%Œãù)×®háXï..~SR¶\êºP×ßa 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FW: Certificate usage
by Salvatore D'Agostino 06 Dec '24

06 Dec '24

Yes, interesting, passing along. Thanks Dan. Building on TLS 1.3 for client/server makes a lot of sense. Here is the technical article referenced in the blog post. 1063.pdf<https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1063.pdf> The record layer effectively uses a receipt. From: Daniel Schleifer <dan(a)idmachines.com> Sent: Friday, December 6, 2024 1:00 PM To: Salvatore D'Agostino <sal(a)idmachines.com> Subject: Certificate usage Hi Sal, I saw this article and thought it was interesting. https://brave.com/blog/distefano/

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