Folks,
On October 23 the US Department of State published a modified Privacy Act system of records notice for passport records. According to AAMVA’s summary, a new routine use (w) authorises disclosure of passport data to federal, state, territorial, tribal and local agencies, and to non-profits, using “federal government verification platforms” to verify identity or citizenship for access to government websites and applications, voter eligibility, and “other government services”. It takes effect November 23 unless comments force a revision. I haven’t yet read the full Federal Register text, so treat the details as AAMVA’s.
It seems to me that falls into our discussion for V2.0:
- It is the online case. Access to government websites and applications is the scope we’re extending v2.0 to cover. The default being built for it is not holder presentation - it’s a central lookup.
- It is phone-home by another name. Tom’s V2 use case already identifies verifiers phoning home to issuers as an information-pattern attack that lets the issuer build a track of user activity. A verification platform querying the passport database does the same thing one step removed. v1.0’s protections against issuer tracking don’t reach a separate authoritative-source query.
- It shows purpose creep through routine uses. Data collected to issue passports was extended to DMV document checks in 2015, and now to voter eligibility and unspecified “other services”, with non-profits added. Purpose binding in v2.0 needs to apply to every party in the verification chain, not just the verifier at the front.
- It raises exclusion risk. Database citizenship matching fails people whose records don’t line up - name changes, naturalised citizens. That’s the same gap RIUP’s IPCQ work exposed, and neither document yet says what happens to someone when the check fails.
Questions I’d like us to consider as v2.0 requirements:
- Is an authoritative-source verification service a named actor, with verifier-equivalent obligations?
- What may it log, and for how long?
- Can the holder learn that a lookup occurred?
- Where both are available, must holder presentation be preferred over a back-end lookup?
- What recourse does the holder have when a lookup fails?
On commenting: I doubt a work group comment could clear Kantara’s process before November 23, but anyone - US members in particular - can comment individually at
regulations.gov under DOS-2026-1156.
I’ll put this on the agenda for our next call.