July 2017 - WG-UMA - mailman.kantarainitiative.org

Notes from UMA Legal telecon 2017-07-28
by Eve Maler 28 Jul '17

28 Jul '17

http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+legal+subgroup+note… 2017-07-28 Attending: Eve, Kathleen, Tim, Bjorn, Mark (Oops, a bug in the diagram, the sharing scenario labels need to be reversed.) The nature of the CO’s access to the resource is determined by the TOS between the CO and the RqP, particularly in the case of a human RqP (Individual scenario). The client app will have certain access-getting capabilities, and will represent those to their user. Who is paying whom for what? In the case of an Individual RqP using a client app, quite often the individual downloads a free app (possibly with in-app purchases) or pays for an app (this would be for mobile apps, including those associated with smart devices, or even for desktop apps). In the case of a Legal Person using a client app, more often there won’t be TOS as such but the client will be developed in-house or done as work for hire by a mobile app dev house. In both cases, an ASO would tend to be in control of which clients they work with because an AS gets to be “picky” about clients -- clients always bring security risks. But different ecosystem pressures can lead ASO’s to be more open or closed. The DirectTrust initial trust bundle (trust framework) was deemed not safe enough so they had to develop a second one. No matter how "dynamic" the process becomes, and the OAuth Dynamic Client Registration protocol is making it quite dynamic, there are reasons for an ASO to potentially want the process to include manual steps, such as lawyers or accountants or other certifiers to get involved. This is precisely where trustmarks and whitelist mechanisms of various sorts are intended to reduce the friction of such manual mechanisms. A client developer could then include a signed assertion in their "SSA" (software statement assertion), which an AS could consume. The technical artifact we could *eventually potentially* take advantage of here is something in the SSA for dynamic client registration for UMA certification. There's a nice older diagram, looking like a train track or puzzle pieces, that shows the various TOS's sticking everything together. What might be better is two train tracks, for the RO and for the RqP, where they build up enough relationships with the RSO/ASO and CO/ASO respectively through the legal/technical artifacts and merge. Ultimately we could show them diverging as the licensing relationship gets torn down. (This would be when we know that we've reached the end of designing the legal framework!) We agree that our goal is to have the legal framework point to the technical artifacts (e.g. as we did in the old Binding Obs <https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/draft-uma-trust.html>), and this is sufficient for now. Various individual tools in the toolkit will ultimately have technical artifacts point to legal artifacts (e.g. URLs containing hashes of the specific versions of text etc.). This latter approach is all implementation-dependent, and so we don't want to optimize prematurely. We should try a) connecting the definition of Data Subject to Resource Owner, to justify why to include Data Subject, or otherwise drop Data Subject, and b) drop Requesting Party Agent and include "with the legal authority to seek access" to Requesting Party, or not drop RqPA and figure out how to square the circle. [image: (smile)] See the list below, and deliverable #1 for use cases! That rationalizes the two halves of the licensing end-to-end relationship. The legal versions of the sharing scenarios should actually look like this: - Individual-to-self (this is potentially interesting legally because Alice tends not to want to impose onerous licensing controls on herself, only on the CO) - Individual-to-Individual - Individual-to-Legal Person (maybe this breaks down along the lines of different business models) - Individual-to- (do we want to consider "Requesting Party Agent" as a role because of use cases?) WRT Data Subject, we could treat that as a whole separate mapping exercise: DS, DP, DC. Should we do that separately? A topic for another time. The ONC Trust Exchange Common Agreement work could potentially point to this work to get to a more dynamic model vs paper-based. *AI:* Eve: Reach out to Domenico to get his help on creating new diagrams that drill into these detailed relationships. *Eve Maler*Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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Reminder: Legal telecon today
by Eve Maler 28 Jul '17

28 Jul '17

Usual Bat time and channel. We'll be working off these slides <https://docs.google.com/a/meshfire.com/presentation/d/1I12agEsfaJK3LEiJyROr…>. (Not sure if just providing this link will work -- please ask for access and I will grant it.) *Eve Maler*Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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Draft minutes of UMA telecon 2017-07-27
by Eve Maler 27 Jul '17

27 Jul '17

http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2017-07-27 MinutesRoll call Quorum was reached. Approve minutes Approve minutes of UMA telecon 2017-07-20 <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2017-07-20>: Deferred. UMA 2.0 work 337a <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues/337>: RFC 7519 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.4> just says these three claims are optional. (Right now we are being inspired by the claims and not registering for JWT claims specifically.) Cigdem, along with Justin, argued for removal of an explicit statement (as we still do for exp) saying exactly what it means when the permission-level parameter is absent. If we don't say, then Eve's interpretation is that "the AS isn't claiming anything" about that semantic. It's up to the AS, presumably, what it means, but that's part of its prerogative. Mike wonders what AS wouldn't include a value. We already say what happens if it has a value at variance with the permission-level value. If we take away the exp "no-value" statement of "never", then the AS has the incentive to do the right thing in any case (vs, say, deciding on a super-secret nbf value of Jan 5, 2020 at 03:59:53). That doesn't help anyone! *Consensus to remove the exp statement.* 337c <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues/337>/d: The suggestion is to 1) make it a MUST for the AS to require public clients to register claims redirection URIs (Grant Sec something), with the rationales that it matches 6749 Sec 3.1.2.2 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2.2> and it's more secure (*we have consensus on this*), and 2) to request registration of a metadata field to the OAuth dynamic client registration metadata registry <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/oauth-parameters.xhtml#cl…> (Grant Sec 2). Would we also want to request registration of a metadaata field to the OIDC dynamic client registration metadata registry, or is it all the same? It appears to be the former. *We have consensus that adding the metadata field is sensible too*, with the rationale that it gives a concrete way to register the URI and removes friction from interoperable dynamic registration. But we do want to check with Justin (who is the designated expert for this metadata registry). This would require a new section or subsection in Grant akin to the AS metadata section. AI: Eve: Ping Justin re claims_redirect_uri metadata field. 337f <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues/337>: We discussed Cigdem's proposed example, which starts with a resource request of album and a permission ticket containing photo1 and photo2, which adds a level of trickiness that may be distracting for the point at hand. We think the calculation seems pretty simple regardless; the AS is "dumb" with respect to resources, even though scopes are resource-bound, so it does the calculatiion the same way regardless. Only the RS knows resource relationships. The AS does an expansive scope match on the client's behalf because the client is "dumb" with respect to resources. AI: Eve (hopefully with Cigdem's input): Come up with a hybrid example that has two resources in the permission ticket. UMA logo Deferred. Attendees As of 7 Mar 2017, quorum is 4 of 7. (Domenico, Sal, Andi, Maciej, Eve, Mike, Cigdem) 1. Domenico 2. Sal 3. Andi 4. Maciej 5. Eve 6. Mike Non-voting participants: - James - Kathleen - Robert - Scott - Bjorn *Eve Maler*Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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For the WG's consideration: open issues
by Eve Maler 26 Jul '17

26 Jul '17

Grant rev 06 <https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/ed/oauth-uma-grant-2.0-06.html> and FedAuthz rev 06 <https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/ed/oauth-uma-federated-authz-2.0-06.…> are now up! These contain implementations of all the agreed-to and purely editorial solutions to Public Comment (and a couple of minor post-Public Comment) issues to date. Issues #335, #337, and #339 (and various sub-issues) are worth discussing, and I'd like to do that in tomorrow's call. I've put some thoughts into the threads already to kick things off. Please feel free to respond in this thread prior to the call! In approximate order of importance: 1. 337a <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues/337>: iat and nbf in the token introspection response don't say what should happen if the permission-level value is missing, while exp does <https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/ed/oauth-uma-federated-authz-2.0-06.…>. We started discussing this last week <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2017-07-20> and didn't quite come to a conclusion (it was shaping up to be "remove what we say even in exp"). Can we decide this quickly? 2. 337c <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues/337>/d: It's been proposed that we register a client metadata element in the "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registry" so that claims_redirect_uri can be formally dynamically registered, and also to make it REQUIRED for public clients to register these URIs. Thoughts? 3. 337f <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues/337>: This was a request for more set math clarification, specifically around what happens if there are multiple permissions in the permission request. To me it was obvious that "it all works the same", but skepticism was expressed. :-) Please see my example in the GitHub thread. Can we riff off that as a solution? 4. 337b <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues/337>: Is my suggestion a good one to add a statement that the client MAY be confidential or public, for clarification? 5. 339 <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues/339>: It seems our description of object vs array in permission requests came out somewhat ambiguous. We have an opportunity here. Should it be possible for RS's to choose which way they request a single permission, with the AS picking up the slack? 6. 335c/d <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues/335>: It was suggested to break out Grant Fig 1 <https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/ed/oauth-uma-grant-2.0-06.html#high-…> into an RO vs RqP flow to show asynchronicity, and then also the latter to be broken out into claims push and interactive claims gathering flows. Theoretically I liked the ideas, but trying to implement them and getting some feedback, I didn't anymore. I think devs will prefer a single summary diagram with all the entities. Thoughts? 7. 337g <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues/337>: I'm recommending no change regarding further protecting permission tickets as being single-use. Sound good? *Eve Maler*Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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Agenda for UMA telecon 2017-07-27
by Eve Maler 26 Jul '17

26 Jul '17

http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2017-07-27 Date and Time - *Thursdays, 9-10am PT* - Screenshare and dial-in: http://join.me/findthomas - UMA calendar: http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Calendar Agenda - Roll call - Approve minutes of UMA telecon 2017-07-20 <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2017-07-20> - UMA V2.0 work: - Disposition of Comments <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+V2.0+Disposition+of…> /GitHub issues for V2.0 <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+l…> /Grant swimlane <https://www.websequencediagrams.com/files/render?link=GDUuGPibcbXrR5uWBSQP> , FedAuthz swimlane <https://www.websequencediagrams.com/files/render?link=tGft5o5ErGvUWj4X3o-O> /Release Notes <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+Release+Notes> /UIG <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+Implementer%27s+Gui…> /Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User-Managed_Access>/Grant rev 06 (forthcoming)/FedAuthz rev 06 (forthcoming) - The Disposition of Comments is the best overall way to drill into what's been done and what remains - Please focus on #335, #337, and #339 – and let's get these all done in one session, so please do some homework before the call - Candidate motion (let's target next week when we'll have had more time to review the latest decisions): "Approve UMA 2.0 Grant rev *nn* and FedAuthz rev *nn* as amended by the instructions of UMA telecon 2017-xx-xx as Draft Recommendations and forward them to the Kantara Leadership Council to request immediate certification for an All-Member Ballot as Recommendations." - UMA2 logo discussion - AOB *Eve Maler*Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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Named permission objects
by James Phillpotts 24 Jul '17

24 Jul '17

Hi all, Eve sent me an email off-list last night asking "Are we going to be sorry we don't have a named object for a single permission?" With clarification this morning, it turns out she was talking about the token introspection endpoint :) You'll remember the response currently looks like: { "active":true, "exp":1256953732, "iat":1256912345, "permissions":[ { "resource_id":"112210f47de98100", "resource_scopes":[ "view", "http://photoz.example.com/dev/actions/print" ], "exp":1256953732 } ] } With a bit more discussion, the only thing I could see as potentially useful was to have permissions as an object (instead of array), and use the resource_id as the key in the object. To do this, we'd have to then make its value an array so that if you have multiple different scopes with different expiry times, they could be expressed effectively, so: { "active":true, "exp":1256953732, "iat":1256912345, "permissions":{ "112210f47de98100":[ { "resource_scopes":[ "view", "http://photoz.example.com/dev/actions/print" ], "exp":1256953732 }, { "resource_scopes":[ "edit" ], "exp":1256953750 } ] } } I'm by no means convinced that this is very much more useful than the current version, and is thoroughly backwards-incompatible, but the object structure could be useful if RPT permission arrays were to get very big. Thoughts? Cheers James

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UMA2 logo proposal (please do not use!)
by Eve Maler 21 Jul '17

21 Jul '17

Here is Domenico's proposal. Let's not use any proposals/drafts till we settle on something. *Eve Maler*Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl Preview attachment UMA_logoV2b.pngUMA_logoV2b.png365 KB <https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=1004c2bba3&view=att&th=15c784379e…>Preview attachment UMA_logoV2_explained.pngUMA_logoV2_explained.png495 KB <https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=1004c2bba3&view=att&th=15c784379e…>

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Notes from UMA Legal telecon 2017-07-21
by Eve Maler 21 Jul '17

21 Jul '17

http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+legal+subgroup+note… 2017-07-21 Attending: Eve, Kathleen, Tim We started looking at chart 6 (not sent in email). Tim would like to ensure that we get the pairwise (or more) relationships, legal devices, and artifacts locked down so that he can revise the definitions. The column mentioning "pairwise" should probably take that word out because some of the artifacts definitely represent more than two of the roles. A *license*, versus a *contract* specifically, gives flexibility around number of parties and promises. It's about tracking permissions. Some permissions are given with some conditions. The license gets revoked if the conditions aren't kept. A license scales better than a contract as a legal mechanism. (Kathleen refers to the licensing model as essentially an authorization model.) A DURSA (data use reciprocal service agreement), from healthcare, is an example of a surrounding contract that could be used to encompass the kind of license we're talking about. Many of the use cases we've collected – a nanny collecting kids from daycare, giving someone access to a connected car – show that there's a desire to ensure a contractual apportionment of liability across to a requesting party in addition to licensing. If this were a contract, the RO Alice would be the offeror, the resource access permissions would be the consideration, and the RqP Bob would theoretically be the offeree – but where is the acceptance part? In the technical layer of UMA, Bob might not have acted positively at all to get access. His client software might have "pushed" claims about him without any action on his part, Alice's AS might issue a PCT to his client that represents claims previously collected and the client subsequently "pushes" that PCT back, but that happens silently. Does that constitute acceptance? Do we have to build that into our model clauses? Using a licensing model, RqP Bob *doesn't* have to accept, and any overarching contract layers could build that in only if they want to. Developing contractual-level tools is out of scope for us. The term "access contract" came from UCITA law. Do we want to use it? It appears in the role definitions, but should we step back from it? Actually, this is between the RO and ASO. So it appears on the wrong line; it should be on the RS-ASO line, not RO-RSO. Or was it correct after all? Are the RSO and ASO both parties to the access contract? The RO becomes *the* licensor, and do the ASO and RSO both become the sub-licensors? It would be helpful, in the "Legal Relationship" column, to always state "*so-and-so* is the *role* for *whom-downstream* of *what* on behalf of *whom-upstream*". E.g., "RSO is sub-licensor on behalf of RO". Maybe we can even construct the columns so that each variable gets filled in, in order, to form a "sentence"? The RO is at the "head" of the relationships. The RO owns the access rights. (In US healthcare, under federal law, a patient owns right of access.) The ASO-CO artifact of OAuth client credentials is only related to that pairwise relationship (not to RqP BoB or to the PCT; this should be relegated to a separate row). It could be related to a contract, say, ToS. It's a *potential place* where conditions that are protective of Alice *could* go, e.g. to ensure that the client (later interacting with Bob, e.g. sharing Alice's data, storing Alice's data, etc.) acts in a way that is aligned with Alice's interests. At the end of the day, the legal aspects have to match the UMA flows and artifacts exactly. *AI:* Eve: Try to do an edited matrix in GSlides form for the group. *Eve Maler*Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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Reminder: Legal telecon tomorrow
by Eve Maler 20 Jul '17

20 Jul '17

8am PT/11am ET http://join.me/findthomas We'll have fresh role definitions, mappings, and diagrams. Good times! *Eve Maler*Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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Draft minutes of UMA telecon 2017-07-20
by Eve Maler 20 Jul '17

20 Jul '17

http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2017-07-20 MinutesRoll call Quorum was reached. Approve minutes Approve minutes of UMA telecon 2017-06-29 <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2017-06-29> and UMA telecon 2017-07-13 <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+telecon+2017-07-13>: APPROVED by unanimous consent. UMA 2.0 work Is the right distinction in the Disposition of Comments document <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+V2.0+Disposition+of…> "Would the change potentially cause anyone to raise a new IPR issue or not?", rather than "Is it 'editorial' or 'technical'?" So if something goes from, say, MUST to something weaker (SHOULD or MAY), that would (could?) raise IPR issues. But just clarifying something that was unclear in the Draft Recommendation would presumably be editorial. Andrew asks: If no one makes a necessary claim, does it matter? "The tree has already fallen in the forest." [image: (smile)] The WG will make its case in the comment log where anything seems marginal. Finalizing the specs Sample motion when the time comes: "Approve UMA 2.0 Grant and FedAuthz revs 06 as amended by the instructions of UMA telecon 2017-xx-xx as Draft Recommendations and forward them to the Kantara Leadership Council to request certification for an All-Member Ballot as Recommendations." #332 <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues/332>: If the AS is "basically" expiring a previous PCT when it goes to a new authorization process, should we say it MUST? It's more like any previous PCT from a previous assessment has be superseded/overcome by events (namely, "one process/one ticket lifecycle"). How explicit do we need to be about this, for implementers to understand this clearly? We're inclined not to add more refresh token-like text, despite the suggestion, because it's a little too prescriptive, and we agree with the commenter's interpretation that *"I would say, that according to the current version, the AS can really choose, whether to expire PCT when issuing a fresh one and the client is not forced to discard the old one."* Using this behavior, the AS and client would each simply have old PCTs from previous authorization processes and could issue/use them for any future authorization processes they want. The wording throughout Grant doesn't prevent this; we checked. Do we now need to consider *clarifying* that this "multiplicity" of uses is okay? Is it ambiguous the way things stand? That is, Eve's reading, in the issue, of "basically" expiring is not required. Justin, James, and Mike (Yuriy) all interpret the current text to be okay with more than one-time use. Optimization of future experience is basically the rationale for PCTs, so this makes sense. Andi brings up the security and privacy considerations; we do cover these, and revocation is also covered, so we're good there. And the AS can always expire at will. No change in the wording. #337 <https://github.com/KantaraInitiative/wg-uma/issues/337>: - exp/iat/nbf: There was an original reason for the "split" logic of talking about what happens when exp is absent vs the others. "If the parameter is absent, the permission does not expire." We tried to mean that the permission could live on past the token lifetime, but this is nonsense. [image: (smile)] What if we delete this sentence, keep the three other sentences allowing the token-level value(s) to take precedence (or refactor that sentence out to the token level), and live with the fact that we don't say anything about the absence of the OPTIONAL values? What is our intent about implementers' behavior? The RS's behavior is about cache control. The AS is likely not to hand back something already expired. Everything beyond active=true is a hint. So the RS could just try again if it didn't get what it wanted. - Did a quick tour through the other items. Most should be easy for disposition. UMA logo ideas AI: Eve: Email out Domenico's first logo idea. Let's send thoughts his way. Attendees As of 7 Mar 2017, quorum is 4 of 7. (Domenico, Sal, Andi, Maciej, Eve, Mike, Cigdem) 1. Domenico 2. Sal 3. Andi 4. Maciej 5. Eve 6. Mike Non-voting participants: - James - Justin - Andrew *Eve Maler*Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl

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