John,
Thanks, the lists are perfect.
Jim
On Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 12:10 PM, Andrew Hughes
Posting as someone with just enough knowledge to be dangerous...
If these WGs were to create a set of stable lists, would they be suitable for listing at IANA? (or have I mashed things together that are too different?)
Or if not IANA, is registry for these kinds of lists (besides Kantara's Trust Registry)?
andrew.
*Andrew Hughes *CISM CISSP Independent Consultant *In Turn Information Management Consulting*
o +1 650.209.7542 m +1 250.888.9474 1249 Palmer Road, Victoria, BC V8P 2H8 AndrewHughes3000@gmail.com ca.linkedin.com/pub/andrew-hughes/a/58/682/ *Identity Management | IT Governance | Information Security *
On Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 9:04 AM, John Wunderlich
wrote: James;
For a rough list see Appendix A in the 0.8 draft of the consent receipt spec http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/download/attachments /76447870/KI-CR08-DRAFT-Recommendation.doc?version=1& modificationDate=1470988059000&api=v2
John Wunderlich,
Sent frum a mobile device, Pleez 4give speling erurz
"...a world of near-total surveillance and endless record-keeping is likely to be one with less liberty, less experimentation, and certainly far less joy..." A. Michael Froomkin
On Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 11:33 AM -0400, "James Hazard" < james.g.hazard@gmail.com> wrote:
Adrian,
Thanks. Happy to support this direction. The GDPR seems a good base.
The piece on PDF and Mozart is great, working my way through it.
All,
If someone has a favorite, even rough, list for any of the specifics, e.g., purpose, data categories ..., I'd put it in, to allow experimenting.
Jim
On Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 9:05 AM, Adrian Gropper
wrote: John-
Thank you for the thoughtful distinction between the role of standards groups like Kantara and advocacy groups like PPR in regulatory capture. PPR has spent much energy in analyzing privacy policies as a result of work we've done to develop and apply our Framework. I spend pretty much all of my time analyzing the privacy impact of standards. These two activities of PPR parallel the two sides of regulatory capture - political and technical - to oversimplify your analysis.
Which brings us back to CommonAccord and related efforts to structure privacy policies that typically are designed to protect the asymmetry that advocates might try to reduce. Wouldn't the introduction of CommonAccord make PPR's job much easier?
For example, a paper like the recent one from EPFL (attached), shows how hard it can be to reduce privacy practices to a useful feature description. The introduction of CommonAccord would make that analysis easier to the extent that GDPR is well designed and forces a clear link between privacy practices and privacy policies - as your comment teaches.
The application of CommonAccord to GDPR could transform the landscape for regulatory capture if CommonAccord is voluntarily adopted by industry in writing their policies or even if a new generation of academics like Prof. Sweeny's or EPFL decides to use natural language processing to map privacy policies into CommonAccord after the fact.
I'm not sure what all this says about the standards work of Kantara and others. UMA-legal, for example, might double down on focusing on GDPR and CommonAccord before looking at the more general problem. That would be interesting.
Adrian
On Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 7:46 AM, John Wunderlich
wrote: Adrian;
Regulatory capture is usually dealt with politically rather than culturally. Witness the activism around net neutrality - there appeared to be real risks of regulatory capture there.
WRT to Uber/Lyft competing on privacy I'd say the following:
1. THe privacy notice published serves as a warranty to protect corporate risk. These documents aren't and shouldn't be expected to serve a primary purpose of protecting customer privacy. 2. If a company wants to compete on privacy it will do it by A) designing and producing products and services with privacy in mind (Privacy by Design if you will) B) Including privacy in marketing and product/service documentation C) Making sure that the privacy notice (public) and the privacy policy (internal) align with the privacy goals. By claiming privacy in marketing, then managing corporate risk will require appropriate updates to the privacy notice 3. In a duopoly or network dominated market, competition is usually not a primary determinant of corporate behaviour. Competition requires a market that is not so clearly dominated by 1 or a few significant players. If a privacy related technology were a disruptive technology it might change the market, and maybe there is a VRM related technology that can serve that role (ahem, JLINC data provenance for example). 4. Change in these market requires regulatory intervention or some other external pressure (like Patient Privacy Rights in health, EFF, EPIC, CDT, Privacy International and so on). As breach publicity rises and as the cost of violating privacy (class action law suits, new and expensive privacy rules and regultarions then (to point 1) managing corporate privacy risks will have to address these concerns.
In other words, business/technical initiatives like VRM and/or Kantara can develop and provide the tools or innovations to enable the possibility of increased patient/customer autonomy. This creates the the potential to address the power imbalance between Alice and EvilBobCo but without public awareness and pressure to help develop market demand and make regulatory allowances, it will be a much harder row to hoe.
John Wunderlich,
Sent frum a mobile device, Pleez 4give speling erurz
"...a world of near-total surveillance and endless record-keeping is likely to be one with less liberty, less experimentation, and certainly far less joy..." A. Michael Froomkin
_____________________________ From: Adrian Gropper
Sent: Saturday, September 3, 2016 11:26 PM Subject: Re: [WG-UMA] Notes from UMA legal telecon 2016-09-02 To: Mark OCG Cc: Deborah Peel , wg-uma@kantarainitiative.org WG I agree with John's explanation of regulatory capture. The way to address it is unclear to me. It's not a standards problem. It's probably a culture problem.
Let's assume we want companies to compete on privacy the way they compete on cost or convenience. A company would then have to be able distinguish itself by highlighting specific privacy features that their competitor does not offer. They would use bold bullet points for privacy the way others do for price, acceleration, or mileage.
imagine two companies selling ride-sharing services, say, Uber and Lyft, with access to all sorts of personal info including phone, locations, credit card, and some social network components. How would one of these companies use Jim's Skeleton of a Privacy Policy below to differentiate themselves?
Adrian
On Saturday, September 3, 2016, Mark OCG
wrote: This is great James, thanks.
- M
On 4 Sep 2016, at 00:28, James Hazard
wrote: Skeleton of a Privacy Policy derived from the GDPR: http://www.commonaccord.org/index.php?action=doc&file=Wx/eu/ europa/eur-lex/GDPR/PrivacyPolicy/Form/0.md
On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 1:44 PM, James Hazard <
james.g.hazard@gmail. com > wrote: > It can be seen as a conversation. There are large-scale actors > (e.g., companies and governments) and small scale (e.g., individuals, > families, friends) and all sizes in between. The large ones are assisted > in the conversation, the small ones less so, often not at all and often > only indirectly by friends, reputations or legal protections. > > Working text as chains - with provenance and targets for > collaboration, rating, comment, law - can improve communication in the > conversation. > > There are strong reasons for collective action (such as the GDPR) > and also strong reasons for small-scale autonomy (adaptation to > circumstance, avoidance monoculture, maintenance of habits and benefits of > people deciding things for themselves). > > My expectation of text-chains (e.g. CommonAccord) is that they will > accelerate some kinds of displacements, but my hope is that they will also > reduce the friction (cost, delay, risk) of small-scale self-governance, > enabling smaller groups to retain independence instead of being overwhelmed > by large scale. > > In any event, the document-orientation and extensibility mean that > people can use the materials like they current use word-processed documents > (the most decentralized system of self-governance we have), but with > greater efficiency, aggregation of social knowledge and, to some extent, > collective bargaining power. > > In an improvised way, I gave names to the various sections of the > GDPR as a preliminary to experimenting with documents like privacy policies > and data transfer agreements that build on the GDPR - > http://www.commonaccord.org/index.php?action=source&file=Wx/ > eu/europa/eur-lex/GDPR/Sec/Article/ListSemantic.md > > > > On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 12:52 PM, Andrew Hughes < >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > andrewhughes3000@ gmail.com > > wrote: > >> Nobody ever said that you were critical about CommonAccord. >> >> The issue I see is that there's lots of non-productive text >> pointing out that this group is failing to address the challenges you >> identify. >> >> I don't really understand the phrase "regulatory capture". Without >> regulations, organizations won't change en masse - those enlightened >> organizations may see some advantage in early action, but will be outliers >> until social norms (and eventually regulations) catch up to them. Kantara >> aims squarely at the needs of organizations within their markets - which >> includes regulators and customer/consumers/clients (and many other actors). >> I have not done an in-depth analysis of the state of regulation and the >> internet - but a cursory survey tells me that the unregulated spaces tend >> to spawn powerful walled-garden oligopolies or monopolies (Uber, Facebook, >> Google, etc) which are capture audiences in different ways. >> >> Stating that "Kantara" has a view on prioritizing industry versus >> individual interests is a false argument. Kantara's view and place in the >> ecosystem is the result of its members input and work. It has no >> organizational position or viewpoint of its own. Kantara provides >> innovators the tools and space and freedom to meet and discuss ways to >> change the world - neutral and open is the mantra. >> >> Will you lead a new Kantara Discussion Group to further explore the >> imbalances in the ecosystem that cause "industry interests" to trump >> "individual interests"? Because that's the mechanism to include topics like >> that in Kantara's scope. Trying to force other WGs to look at issues >> tangential to their mandates isn't going to work very well. >> >> You will get strong participation in such a DG - there are many in >> the Consent and Information Sharing, UMA, , myData, Personal Data >> Ecosystem, and other communities that would be enthusiastic contributors. >> The DG would be supported in writing a Kantara Report that assists the >> other DG/WG on understanding the issues and aligning correctly. >> >> What do you say? Charter up and get going? >> >> Andrew. >> Kantara Initiative Leadership Council Chair >> >> >> *Andrew Hughes *CISM CISSP >> Independent Consultant >> *In Turn Information Management Consulting* >> >> o +1 650.209.7542 >> m +1 250.888.9474 >> 1249 Palmer Road, >> Victoria, BC V8P 2H8 >> AndrewHughes3000@gmail.com >> ca.linkedin.com/pub/andrew-hughes/a/58/682/ >> *Identity Management | IT Governance | Information Security * >> >> On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 8:48 AM, Adrian Gropper < >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> agropper@healthurl. com >> > wrote: >> >>> My comment was in no way a criticism of CommonAccord. I have >>> supported that project for years and it's still the only thing like it that >>> I know of and it makes sense. >>> >>> My comment is critical of regulatory capture and the way we >>> translate innovations like CommonAccord and regulatory initiatives like >>> GDPR into industry practice. Governance is at the heart of the issue. The >>> standards mechanism, including Kantara, is not set up to put individual and >>> civil society interests above industry interests. Regulatory mechanisms >>> like GDPR and the US "Meaningful Use" debacle are not set up to create >>> standards. Regulatory capture is the result. >>> >>> The places I've experienced pushback on regulatory capture is UMA, >>> (where, under Eve's leadership, we have consistently sought to widen the >>> ecosystem and consider individual rights equal to institutional) and the >>> blockchain communities where avoiding regulatory capture is a religion in >>> itself. >>> >>> My comment, which was obviously unclear, was a call for us to >>> consider the governance mechanisms that might result in creating structured >>> and standardized privacy policies based on CommonAccord and GDPR. >>> >>> One place where we're trying to make a dent in this governance >>> issue is W3C. The idea is to convene an outcome-driven community (not a >>> standards-track process) designed to combine UMA and blockchain and other >>> standards to create a "stack" of protocols that captures the fundamentals >>> of privacy engineering and re-balances the power of individuals over >>> institutions. W3C Verifiable Claims is another example of a standard that >>> will be core to privacy engineering if it survives regulatory capture. You >>> can read about this as paper #7 at http://www.hhs.gov/about/ne >>> ws/2016/08/29/onc-announces-blockchain-challenge-winners.html (Hint: >>> read paper #13 first to get a very nice introduction to why #7.) >>> >>> Adrian >>> >>> On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 10:08 AM, James Hazard < >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>