Ah, thanks for the clarification.
We do take a pretty strong (provocatively so?) stance in the paper, in order to kickstart a conversation towards alternatives. But surely it’s not the first such argument? Kim’s definition in her book makes what we experience as consent in digital contexts truly seem like the farthest thing from meeting the definition, particularly the closer you get to the beginning of a service provider-user relationship.
I need to go read Kim’s stuff. But that definitely makes sense, calling digital things consent - with no transparency, awareness or notice, is not the social, legal or even human understanding of consent. In this way the law for consent may be behind the times, or, it could be mis use of the term.
I associate the concept with autonomy and choice in how my personal data is treated by traditional infrastructure an systems. Perhaps the digital consent being alluded to needs a better distinction than consent ? It does seem pretty clear - privacy law does not manage digital identity gaps very well.
Looking forward to the paper.
Mark