PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models
John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other. Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion? - Rainer
I would suggest this live in the FIWG. I also agree with Rainer's second bullet, but also suggest that an RFC-3647 like credential policy is needed as a part of the larger Framework. I am, in fact, in the process of developing same for SAFE-BioPharma as we add non-PKI credentials to our identity management scheme. As we move forward we will be offering both PKI and non-PKI credentials to our Subscribers in the biopharmaceutical and healthcare industries. Rich Furr Head Global Regulatory Affairs and Compliance New Office: 980-236-7576 Cell: 201-220-0160 From: wg-fi-bounces@kantarainitiative.org [mailto:wg-fi-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] On Behalf Of Rainer Hörbe Sent: Monday, March 14, 2011 8:09 AM To: FI WG; dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Cc: Curry Patrick Subject: [WG-FI] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like * PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA * To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed * Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other. Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion? - Rainer
It is a complicated almost religious discussion. I don't think assertions (SAML, openID) or PKI client Auth are going away any time soon. The trust model and technology are slightly disjoint discussions. People can use smartcards with self issued certificates and SAML providers can sign assertions with certificates with roots ross certified to specific PKI bridges. This is probably more a FIWG discussion. That is where the rubber hits the road for the more complicated cross federation issues, when it comes to trust models. For certificates vs assertions there is a privacy related issue. Depending on the use case. For Defence intelligence and Police credentials there may be no expectation of privacy or anonymity or privacy when your credential is used. However many privacy people in the Citizen to Gov use case want to stop correlating identifiers across sites. In some case there is a legal requirement for this. I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic. In the US FICAM anticipates the vast majority of external credentials it will accept to be assertion based. I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however. The reality is that the main driving force on the internet is access to API, and attributes. SSO is just something that is going along for the ride. The US Gov PIV card deployment needs BAE (SAML attribute query) to retrieve attributes and be useful. (perhaps overstated) Lets discuss how you want to separate the issues. If we tackle them all together we will probably get nowhere. John B. On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote:
John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other.
Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion?
- Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf>
+1 We have a number of customers who use PKI (for AuthN) in combination with SAML (for AuthZ). SAML is used to move user attributes from the IdP to the SP to allow the SP to make authorization decisions. These attributes are stored in a Directory at the IdP rather than being 'baked into' the users certificate. The main reason seems to be an expectation that these attributes will change much more often than the users certificate will be renewed. (And yes in this context SAML Assertions do start to sound an awful lot like 'attribute certiicates'). On Mon, Mar 14, 2011 at 10:50 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
It is a complicated almost religious discussion.
I don't think assertions (SAML, openID) or PKI client Auth are going away any time soon.
The trust model and technology are slightly disjoint discussions.
People can use smartcards with self issued certificates and SAML providers can sign assertions with certificates with roots ross certified to specific PKI bridges.
This is probably more a FIWG discussion.
That is where the rubber hits the road for the more complicated cross federation issues, when it comes to trust models.
For certificates vs assertions there is a privacy related issue. Depending on the use case. For Defence intelligence and Police credentials there may be no expectation of privacy or anonymity or privacy when your credential is used.
However many privacy people in the Citizen to Gov use case want to stop correlating identifiers across sites. In some case there is a legal requirement for this.
I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic.
In the US FICAM anticipates the vast majority of external credentials it will accept to be assertion based.
I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however.
The reality is that the main driving force on the internet is access to API, and attributes. SSO is just something that is going along for the ride.
The US Gov PIV card deployment needs BAE (SAML attribute query) to retrieve attributes and be useful. (perhaps overstated)
Lets discuss how you want to separate the issues. If we tackle them all together we will probably get nowhere.
John B.
On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote:
John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like
- PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA - To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed - Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other.
Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion?
- Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf>
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Yes that is a popular solution inside Enterprises and some Gov. The problem is scalability and user consent. In the US PIV BAE case the permission to make a SAML query on the identifier (FASC-N) in the certificate is on a agency by agency basis. There is no way for the owner agency to know if the requester needs the info of if the user is asking for access. Given the high level of trust between agencies, they tend not make info available. The problem is as the distance between the parties gets larger, releasing information without some sort of user confirmation becomes more problematic. In those cases we have discussed using SAML Holder of Key between organizations to be able to provide more control over attribute release while maintaining the security of the session binding to the card keys. There are multiple approaches. John B. On 2011-03-14, at 11:47 AM, Patrick Harding wrote:
+1
We have a number of customers who use PKI (for AuthN) in combination with SAML (for AuthZ). SAML is used to move user attributes from the IdP to the SP to allow the SP to make authorization decisions. These attributes are stored in a Directory at the IdP rather than being 'baked into' the users certificate. The main reason seems to be an expectation that these attributes will change much more often than the users certificate will be renewed. (And yes in this context SAML Assertions do start to sound an awful lot like 'attribute certiicates').
On Mon, Mar 14, 2011 at 10:50 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote: It is a complicated almost religious discussion.
I don't think assertions (SAML, openID) or PKI client Auth are going away any time soon.
The trust model and technology are slightly disjoint discussions.
People can use smartcards with self issued certificates and SAML providers can sign assertions with certificates with roots ross certified to specific PKI bridges.
This is probably more a FIWG discussion.
That is where the rubber hits the road for the more complicated cross federation issues, when it comes to trust models.
For certificates vs assertions there is a privacy related issue. Depending on the use case. For Defence intelligence and Police credentials there may be no expectation of privacy or anonymity or privacy when your credential is used.
However many privacy people in the Citizen to Gov use case want to stop correlating identifiers across sites. In some case there is a legal requirement for this.
I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic.
In the US FICAM anticipates the vast majority of external credentials it will accept to be assertion based.
I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however.
The reality is that the main driving force on the internet is access to API, and attributes. SSO is just something that is going along for the ride.
The US Gov PIV card deployment needs BAE (SAML attribute query) to retrieve attributes and be useful. (perhaps overstated)
Lets discuss how you want to separate the issues. If we tackle them all together we will probably get nowhere.
John B.
On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote:
John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other.
Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion?
- Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf>
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Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI: For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication? Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2. U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out. Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers. For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates? A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove. Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission? Thanks Bob P. On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote:
I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic. I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however.
On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote:
John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like
* PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA * To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed * Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other.
Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion?
- Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf>
Hi Bob, that's certainly an interesting line of thought/ potential focus from the Info Sharing work group perspective - whether strategy sub-committee or otherwise. I've long thought that customer experience/ business case for the individual is a missing link in the whole identity assurance discussion, and am happy to get involved in any work heading in that direction. Thanks Iain On 14 Mar 2011, at 17:15, Bob Pinheiro wrote:
Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI:
For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication?
Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2.
U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out.
Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers.
For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates?
A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove.
Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission?
Thanks
Bob P.
On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote:
I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic. I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however.
On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote:
John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like • PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA • To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed • Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other.
Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion?
- Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf>
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So the problem with client side Certs is the way they are implemented..with security in mind only, not privacy. 'Promiscuous' is the label given to them down here.. That's why the NZ Government does not use them in its consumer online service strategy... And I might point out that it's too much of a generalisation for my comfort to say to that 'eGov prefers PKI' (Rainer's 5th bullet) The lines between law enforcement/security (with no privacy) and consumer service/security (with privacy) seem to be getting blurred in some folks' minds (certainly not Bob's, nor John's..) <<BP: For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates>> Maybe, but I think it won't be listened to. The change has got to take place at the doors (hearts and minds) of the browser vendors, and the logical co-ordination point for that is the CA Browser forum. I'm trying to think of the directional pressure that might persuade them to tackle this problem - the Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners group? Maybe. Kantara? Nope. At least not unless KI is pushing at an open door.. Cheers Colin From: lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org [mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] On Behalf Of Bob Pinheiro Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 6:16 a.m. To: John Bradley Cc: dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI: For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication? Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2. U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out. Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers. For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates? A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove. Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission? Thanks Bob P. On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote: I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic. I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however. On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote: John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like * PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA * To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed * Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other. Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion? - Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf> ==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. 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Colin, I spent many years with the PKI Forum and other places pushing the better browser support rock up the hill to no great success. There has been no detectable improvement in mutual TLS support. On the other hand EV certs got in because there was a clear revenue model to the PKI Forum participants. Some of the problem relates to TLS itself and the rest with the browser venders. If I had to get one thing from them it would be a way to do ephemeral keys for HoK as STORK and others have been asking for, also to no great success. If someone wants to put together a gang to take on the browser venders I am in, but I am realistic about any real progress after 10 years or so of trying. John B. On 2011-03-14, at 5:56 PM, Colin Wallis wrote:
So the problem with client side Certs is the way they are implemented..with security in mind only, not privacy. 'Promiscuous' is the label given to them down here..
That's why the NZ Government does not use them in its consumer online service strategy…
And I might point out that it's too much of a generalisation for my comfort to say to that 'eGov prefers PKI' (Rainer's 5th bullet)
The lines between law enforcement/security (with no privacy) and consumer service/security (with privacy) seem to be getting blurred in some folks' minds (certainly not Bob's, nor John's..)
<<BP: For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates>>
Maybe, but I think it won't be listened to. The change has got to take place at the doors (hearts and minds) of the browser vendors, and the logical co-ordination point for that is the CA Browser forum. I'm trying to think of the directional pressure that might persuade them to tackle this problem - the Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners group? Maybe. Kantara? Nope. At least not unless KI is pushing at an open door..
Cheers Colin
From: lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org [mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] On Behalf Of Bob Pinheiro Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 6:16 a.m. To: John Bradley Cc: dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models
Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI:
For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication?
Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2.
U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out.
Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers.
For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates?
A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove.
Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission?
Thanks
Bob P.
On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote: I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic. I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however.
On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote:
John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other.
Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion?
- Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf>
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OK, but it's still possible to use certificates for strong authentication of consumers if the certificate is contained on a USB smartcard token. Of course, relying parties must accept certificates for consumer authentication. Maybe there is a chicken-and-egg problem here: RPs may have little interest until someone shows them a strong authentication solution using certificates and smartcards that is economically viable for adoption and use by consumers. But will smartcard vendors devote resources to this until they see a consumer market? The Smart Card Alliance <http://www.smartcardalliance.org/> is a member of Kantara, and is also interested in getting smartcard technology into the hands of consumers. The Smart Card Alliance is represented on the Consumer Identity WG because they were hoping to get some insight into consumer interest in, and adoption of, smartcards. Unfortunately, that kind of insight doesn't exist within the Kantara community. At least not within CIWG. Yet the Smart Card Alliance has an Identity Council <http://www.smartcardalliance.org/pages/activities-councils-identity>, so there ought to be some opportunities for collaboration between Kantara and Smart Card Alliance. There are at least two areas where our interests probably overlap: use of smartcards for access to patient health records, and smartcards as form factors for identity credentials usable within the "ecosystem" enabled by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace. Another Kantara member is Fraunhofer FOKUS, which is the host of the next Kantara meeting, and is also a provider (?) of German eID cards. And although there seems to be no formal working relationships between Kantara and Microsoft, smartcards were used to provide secure U-Prove tokens for an RSA demo by splitting the token's private key between the user's computing device and the smartcard. So there seems to be a number of areas of where certificates and smartcards can be used for strong authentication and/or high assurance claims. If these topics are of sufficient interest within Kantara, and resources can be found, perhaps there are opportunities for collaboration with Smart Card Alliance and others. Bob P. On 3/14/2011 6:25 PM, John Bradley wrote:
Colin,
I spent many years with the PKI Forum and other places pushing the better browser support rock up the hill to no great success.
There has been no detectable improvement in mutual TLS support. On the other hand EV certs got in because there was a clear revenue model to the PKI Forum participants.
Some of the problem relates to TLS itself and the rest with the browser venders.
If I had to get one thing from them it would be a way to do ephemeral keys for HoK as STORK and others have been asking for, also to no great success.
If someone wants to put together a gang to take on the browser venders I am in, but I am realistic about any real progress after 10 years or so of trying.
John B. On 2011-03-14, at 5:56 PM, Colin Wallis wrote:
So the problem with client side Certs is the way they are implemented..with security in mind only, not privacy. 'Promiscuous' is the label given to them down here.. That's why the NZ Government does not use them in its consumer online service strategy… And I might point out that it's too much of a generalisation for my comfort to say to that 'eGov prefers PKI' (Rainer's 5th bullet) The lines between law enforcement/security (with no privacy) and consumer service/security (with privacy) seem to be getting blurred in some folks' minds (certainly not Bob's, nor John's..) <<BP:For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates>> Maybe, but I think it won't be listened to. The change has got to take place at the doors (hearts and minds) of the browser vendors, and the logical co-ordination point for that is the CA Browser forum. I'm trying to think of the directional pressure that might persuade them to tackle this problem - the Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners group? Maybe. Kantara? Nope. At least not unless KI is pushing at an open door.. Cheers Colin *From:*lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org>[mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org]*On Behalf Of*Bob Pinheiro *Sent:*Tuesday, 15 March 2011 6:16 a.m. *To:*John Bradley *Cc:*dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org>; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara *Subject:*Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI:
For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication?
Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2.
U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out.
Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers.
For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates?
A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove.
Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission?
Thanks
Bob P.
On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote: I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic.
I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however.
On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote:
John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like
* PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA * To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed * Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other.
Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion? - Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf>
==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ====
Bob Some interesting thoughts ..(moreso if one had decided to use smartcard technology). FWIW, the emerging view from our program down in this little country is that end user/citizen folks want to carry another card around like a hole in the head. It would be different if we already had a sizable penetration of smartcards but we don't. However, we see many more possibilities with the ubiquitous mobile device. Those possibilities are dashed right now because the things that make identity work are hardwired into the OS with really, let's face it, no security. And, a bit like the browser vendors, I guess there is no incentive/pressure on them to change, and understandably the unit price would go up. But wouldn't it be great to have a *separated* secure standardised TPM for things that customers carry round with them whatever they were... Bill, our lead architect uses an example of a phone, with all its usual stuff on one side and the TPM module on the back. We heard that Iron Key are going the TPM-type way, so that seems to line up with Bob's reference below. And this is getting close to our notion. But still, you want the USB to also do its usual storage functions and more too, right? Cheers Colin From: Bob Pinheiro [mailto:kantara@bobpinheiro.com] Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 5:43 p.m. To: John Bradley Cc: Colin Wallis; dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models OK, but it's still possible to use certificates for strong authentication of consumers if the certificate is contained on a USB smartcard token. Of course, relying parties must accept certificates for consumer authentication. Maybe there is a chicken-and-egg problem here: RPs may have little interest until someone shows them a strong authentication solution using certificates and smartcards that is economically viable for adoption and use by consumers. But will smartcard vendors devote resources to this until they see a consumer market? The Smart Card Alliance<http://www.smartcardalliance.org/> is a member of Kantara, and is also interested in getting smartcard technology into the hands of consumers. The Smart Card Alliance is represented on the Consumer Identity WG because they were hoping to get some insight into consumer interest in, and adoption of, smartcards. Unfortunately, that kind of insight doesn't exist within the Kantara community. At least not within CIWG. Yet the Smart Card Alliance has an Identity Council<http://www.smartcardalliance.org/pages/activities-councils-identity>, so there ought to be some opportunities for collaboration between Kantara and Smart Card Alliance. There are at least two areas where our interests probably overlap: use of smartcards for access to patient health records, and smartcards as form factors for identity credentials usable within the "ecosystem" enabled by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace. Another Kantara member is Fraunhofer FOKUS, which is the host of the next Kantara meeting, and is also a provider (?) of German eID cards. And although there seems to be no formal working relationships between Kantara and Microsoft, smartcards were used to provide secure U-Prove tokens for an RSA demo by splitting the token's private key between the user's computing device and the smartcard. So there seems to be a number of areas of where certificates and smartcards can be used for strong authentication and/or high assurance claims. If these topics are of sufficient interest within Kantara, and resources can be found, perhaps there are opportunities for collaboration with Smart Card Alliance and others. Bob P. On 3/14/2011 6:25 PM, John Bradley wrote: Colin, I spent many years with the PKI Forum and other places pushing the better browser support rock up the hill to no great success. There has been no detectable improvement in mutual TLS support. On the other hand EV certs got in because there was a clear revenue model to the PKI Forum participants. Some of the problem relates to TLS itself and the rest with the browser venders. If I had to get one thing from them it would be a way to do ephemeral keys for HoK as STORK and others have been asking for, also to no great success. If someone wants to put together a gang to take on the browser venders I am in, but I am realistic about any real progress after 10 years or so of trying. John B. On 2011-03-14, at 5:56 PM, Colin Wallis wrote: So the problem with client side Certs is the way they are implemented..with security in mind only, not privacy. 'Promiscuous' is the label given to them down here.. That's why the NZ Government does not use them in its consumer online service strategy... And I might point out that it's too much of a generalisation for my comfort to say to that 'eGov prefers PKI' (Rainer's 5th bullet) The lines between law enforcement/security (with no privacy) and consumer service/security (with privacy) seem to be getting blurred in some folks' minds (certainly not Bob's, nor John's..) <<BP: For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates>> Maybe, but I think it won't be listened to. The change has got to take place at the doors (hearts and minds) of the browser vendors, and the logical co-ordination point for that is the CA Browser forum. I'm trying to think of the directional pressure that might persuade them to tackle this problem - the Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners group? Maybe. Kantara? Nope. At least not unless KI is pushing at an open door.. Cheers Colin From: lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org> [mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] On Behalf Of Bob Pinheiro Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 6:16 a.m. To: John Bradley Cc: dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org>; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI: For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication? Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2. U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out. Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers. For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates? A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove. Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission? Thanks Bob P. On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote: I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic. I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however. On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote: John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like * PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA * To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed * Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other. Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion? - Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf> ==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ==== ==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ====
Bob, SmartCards can be positioned in vertical markets, where there is a fine tuned value proposition and quality level for users and service providers, usually bundled with some "physical" benefit of the card like a customer loyalty program or physical access control. My view is that the way to better market penetration is to build these islands and then connect them using both pki and non-pki federations. I would not expect any breakthrough soon. - Rainer Am 16.03.2011 um 00:55 schrieb Colin Wallis:
Bob
Some interesting thoughts ..(moreso if one had decided to use smartcard technology).
FWIW, the emerging view from our program down in this little country is that end user/citizen folks want to carry another card around like a hole in the head. It would be different if we already had a sizable penetration of smartcards but we don't. However, we see many more possibilities with the ubiquitous mobile device. Those possibilities are dashed right now because the things that make identity work are hardwired into the OS with really, let's face it, no security. And, a bit like the browser vendors, I guess there is no incentive/pressure on them to change, and understandably the unit price would go up.
But wouldn't it be great to have a *separated* secure standardised TPM for things that customers carry round with them whatever they were… Bill, our lead architect uses an example of a phone, with all its usual stuff on one side and the TPM module on the back. We heard that Iron Key are going the TPM-type way, so that seems to line up with Bob's reference below. And this is getting close to our notion. But still, you want the USB to also do its usual storage functions and more too, right?
Cheers Colin
From: Bob Pinheiro [mailto:kantara@bobpinheiro.com] Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 5:43 p.m. To: John Bradley Cc: Colin Wallis; dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models
OK, but it's still possible to use certificates for strong authentication of consumers if the certificate is contained on a USB smartcard token. Of course, relying parties must accept certificates for consumer authentication. Maybe there is a chicken-and-egg problem here: RPs may have little interest until someone shows them a strong authentication solution using certificates and smartcards that is economically viable for adoption and use by consumers. But will smartcard vendors devote resources to this until they see a consumer market?
The Smart Card Alliance is a member of Kantara, and is also interested in getting smartcard technology into the hands of consumers. The Smart Card Alliance is represented on the Consumer Identity WG because they were hoping to get some insight into consumer interest in, and adoption of, smartcards. Unfortunately, that kind of insight doesn't exist within the Kantara community. At least not within CIWG. Yet the Smart Card Alliance has an Identity Council, so there ought to be some opportunities for collaboration between Kantara and Smart Card Alliance. There are at least two areas where our interests probably overlap: use of smartcards for access to patient health records, and smartcards as form factors for identity credentials usable within the "ecosystem" enabled by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace.
Another Kantara member is Fraunhofer FOKUS, which is the host of the next Kantara meeting, and is also a provider (?) of German eID cards. And although there seems to be no formal working relationships between Kantara and Microsoft, smartcards were used to provide secure U-Prove tokens for an RSA demo by splitting the token's private key between the user's computing device and the smartcard.
So there seems to be a number of areas of where certificates and smartcards can be used for strong authentication and/or high assurance claims. If these topics are of sufficient interest within Kantara, and resources can be found, perhaps there are opportunities for collaboration with Smart Card Alliance and others.
Bob P.
On 3/14/2011 6:25 PM, John Bradley wrote: Colin,
I spent many years with the PKI Forum and other places pushing the better browser support rock up the hill to no great success.
There has been no detectable improvement in mutual TLS support. On the other hand EV certs got in because there was a clear revenue model to the PKI Forum participants.
Some of the problem relates to TLS itself and the rest with the browser venders.
If I had to get one thing from them it would be a way to do ephemeral keys for HoK as STORK and others have been asking for, also to no great success.
If someone wants to put together a gang to take on the browser venders I am in, but I am realistic about any real progress after 10 years or so of trying.
John B. On 2011-03-14, at 5:56 PM, Colin Wallis wrote:
So the problem with client side Certs is the way they are implemented..with security in mind only, not privacy. 'Promiscuous' is the label given to them down here..
That's why the NZ Government does not use them in its consumer online service strategy…
And I might point out that it's too much of a generalisation for my comfort to say to that 'eGov prefers PKI' (Rainer's 5th bullet)
The lines between law enforcement/security (with no privacy) and consumer service/security (with privacy) seem to be getting blurred in some folks' minds (certainly not Bob's, nor John's..)
<<BP: For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates>>
Maybe, but I think it won't be listened to. The change has got to take place at the doors (hearts and minds) of the browser vendors, and the logical co-ordination point for that is the CA Browser forum. I'm trying to think of the directional pressure that might persuade them to tackle this problem - the Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners group? Maybe. Kantara? Nope. At least not unless KI is pushing at an open door..
Cheers Colin
From: lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org [mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] On Behalf Of Bob Pinheiro Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 6:16 a.m. To: John Bradley Cc: dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models
Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI:
For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication?
Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2.
U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out.
Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers.
For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates?
A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove.
Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission?
Thanks
Bob P.
On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote: I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic. I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however.
On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote:
John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other.
Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion?
- Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf>
==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ====
==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ==== _______________________________________________ LC mailing list LC@kantarainitiative.org http://kantarainitiative.org/mailman/listinfo/lc
Yep, fair point Rainer, regards the how SmartCards can come into play and 'connecting islands'.. It's not that we are totally averse to any PKI. We are looking at PKI-ish solution as one of a number of options for federating government agencies. But this is not customer/end user facing. Cheers Colin From: Rainer Hörbe [mailto:rainer@hoerbe.at] Sent: Wednesday, 16 March 2011 8:37 p.m. To: Bob Pinheiro Cc: Colin Wallis; dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; FI WG; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models Bob, SmartCards can be positioned in vertical markets, where there is a fine tuned value proposition and quality level for users and service providers, usually bundled with some "physical" benefit of the card like a customer loyalty program or physical access control. My view is that the way to better market penetration is to build these islands and then connect them using both pki and non-pki federations. I would not expect any breakthrough soon. - Rainer Am 16.03.2011 um 00:55 schrieb Colin Wallis: Bob Some interesting thoughts ..(moreso if one had decided to use smartcard technology). FWIW, the emerging view from our program down in this little country is that end user/citizen folks want to carry another card around like a hole in the head. It would be different if we already had a sizable penetration of smartcards but we don't. However, we see many more possibilities with the ubiquitous mobile device. Those possibilities are dashed right now because the things that make identity work are hardwired into the OS with really, let's face it, no security. And, a bit like the browser vendors, I guess there is no incentive/pressure on them to change, and understandably the unit price would go up. But wouldn't it be great to have a *separated* secure standardised TPM for things that customers carry round with them whatever they were... Bill, our lead architect uses an example of a phone, with all its usual stuff on one side and the TPM module on the back. We heard that Iron Key are going the TPM-type way, so that seems to line up with Bob's reference below. And this is getting close to our notion. But still, you want the USB to also do its usual storage functions and more too, right? Cheers Colin From: Bob Pinheiro [mailto:kantara@bobpinheiro.com] Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 5:43 p.m. To: John Bradley Cc: Colin Wallis; dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org>; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models OK, but it's still possible to use certificates for strong authentication of consumers if the certificate is contained on a USB smartcard token. Of course, relying parties must accept certificates for consumer authentication. Maybe there is a chicken-and-egg problem here: RPs may have little interest until someone shows them a strong authentication solution using certificates and smartcards that is economically viable for adoption and use by consumers. But will smartcard vendors devote resources to this until they see a consumer market? The Smart Card Alliance<http://www.smartcardalliance.org/> is a member of Kantara, and is also interested in getting smartcard technology into the hands of consumers. The Smart Card Alliance is represented on the Consumer Identity WG because they were hoping to get some insight into consumer interest in, and adoption of, smartcards. Unfortunately, that kind of insight doesn't exist within the Kantara community. At least not within CIWG. Yet the Smart Card Alliance has an Identity Council<http://www.smartcardalliance.org/pages/activities-councils-identity>, so there ought to be some opportunities for collaboration between Kantara and Smart Card Alliance. There are at least two areas where our interests probably overlap: use of smartcards for access to patient health records, and smartcards as form factors for identity credentials usable within the "ecosystem" enabled by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace. Another Kantara member is Fraunhofer FOKUS, which is the host of the next Kantara meeting, and is also a provider (?) of German eID cards. And although there seems to be no formal working relationships between Kantara and Microsoft, smartcards were used to provide secure U-Prove tokens for an RSA demo by splitting the token's private key between the user's computing device and the smartcard. So there seems to be a number of areas of where certificates and smartcards can be used for strong authentication and/or high assurance claims. If these topics are of sufficient interest within Kantara, and resources can be found, perhaps there are opportunities for collaboration with Smart Card Alliance and others. Bob P. On 3/14/2011 6:25 PM, John Bradley wrote: Colin, I spent many years with the PKI Forum and other places pushing the better browser support rock up the hill to no great success. There has been no detectable improvement in mutual TLS support. On the other hand EV certs got in because there was a clear revenue model to the PKI Forum participants. Some of the problem relates to TLS itself and the rest with the browser venders. If I had to get one thing from them it would be a way to do ephemeral keys for HoK as STORK and others have been asking for, also to no great success. If someone wants to put together a gang to take on the browser venders I am in, but I am realistic about any real progress after 10 years or so of trying. John B. On 2011-03-14, at 5:56 PM, Colin Wallis wrote: So the problem with client side Certs is the way they are implemented..with security in mind only, not privacy. 'Promiscuous' is the label given to them down here.. That's why the NZ Government does not use them in its consumer online service strategy... And I might point out that it's too much of a generalisation for my comfort to say to that 'eGov prefers PKI' (Rainer's 5th bullet) The lines between law enforcement/security (with no privacy) and consumer service/security (with privacy) seem to be getting blurred in some folks' minds (certainly not Bob's, nor John's..) <<BP: For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates>> Maybe, but I think it won't be listened to. The change has got to take place at the doors (hearts and minds) of the browser vendors, and the logical co-ordination point for that is the CA Browser forum. I'm trying to think of the directional pressure that might persuade them to tackle this problem - the Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners group? Maybe. Kantara? Nope. At least not unless KI is pushing at an open door.. Cheers Colin From: lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org> [mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] On Behalf Of Bob Pinheiro Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 6:16 a.m. To: John Bradley Cc: dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org>; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI: For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication? Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2. U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out. Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers. For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates? A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove. Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission? Thanks Bob P. On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote: I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic. I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however. On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote: John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like * PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA * To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed * Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other. Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion? - Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf> ==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ==== ==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ==== _______________________________________________ LC mailing list LC@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:LC@kantarainitiative.org> http://kantarainitiative.org/mailman/listinfo/lc ==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. 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For the consumer market, I agree that an obvious strong authentication device would be a mobile phone. If the phone is a smartphone, then it's also a smartcard because it incorporates a chip for processing, just like a plastic smartcard. If such a smartphone is going to be used to access online apps requiring strong authentication, then the chip could incorporate a certificate for that purpose. But if the consumer is going to access these apps on a different computer, then using the mobile phone as an authentication device isn't going to work if authentication is based on the certificate. So an alternative is to incorporate a one-time password generator, or even to use the phone to receive a one-time authorization code via SMS. But that's cumbersome IMO. If I'm going to do online banking from my laptop computer, I don't want to have to get out my cell phone and generate a OTP, then type it into the computer. Or depend on being able to receive a SMS message and then type that into the computer. So while a mobile phone may work in some situations, for others (IMO) it would be too cumbersome. For those apps, a USB device housing a certificate seems like the most secure and convenient choice. Just stick the device into the computer's USB port, enter a password, and you're good to go. For strong online authentication purposes, a USB device incorporating smartcard technology makes more sense to me than a plastic smartcard, which would require a card reader that most consumers don't have, and that would still have to be available at each computer the consumer uses. A single USB smartcard device could not only house multiple certificates for a variety of relying parties, or maybe just a single certificate trusted by multiple relying parties. It could also house an active client / claims agent to make portable a collection of long-lived U-Prove tokens. [Long-lived U-Prove tokens could transmit claims to relying parties without needing an identity provider to be available when the claims are required. This seems to be an important consideration, given that the providers of high value services may not want to shut out their customers if an identity provider is offline.] You may object and say that people don't want to carry around another device. But consider this: people already carry around a lot of keys for different things. You need a key to get into your house. Different keys for different doors, even. You need another key to start your car. You may need another key to get into your office, or to unlock your desk drawer. Carrying around a bunch of keys is something that people are used to doing. So what's the big deal about carrying around a small USB thingy to unlock all your important online stuff? That's not necessarily the argument I would use to sell the idea of USB devices as authentication devices. And a USB smartcard is probably too expensive for the mass consumer market at this time. For instance, an IronKey costs about $80 US. Maybe there are less expensive alternatives, but still, the only way this scenario would probably work is if consumers are simply given these USB smartcard devices and instructed to insert them into the computer's USB port when doing online banking, etc. But who would provide these devices to consumers, and educate them as to their use? This gets back to the biggest problem that I think is impeding the deployment of strong authN and high assurance claims for consumers.....at least in the US. There needs to be relying parties such as banks, healthcare providers, social networking sites (???) and others that want to reduce identity-related fraud through the use of high assurance claims and strong authentication, and are willing to help bankroll the deployment of strong authN to the masses. Given the right incentives, maybe different consortia would arise within different trust communities such as banking, healthcare, etc., that might distribute USB smartcards (provided the economics can be made to work). But once a consumer possesses one, he/she ought to be able to install certificates or U-Prove tokens into the device for all the different high assurance applications across these trust communities. Obviously there are going to be big issues to tackle to make such a scheme work, and not everyone may agree with my viewpoint. In Europe they seem to like plastic smartcards that require a card reader. But isn't this sort of what's being proposed by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace? Even though it is voluntary, obviously the goal is to have high adoption levels. So something like what I'm proposing seems necessary. Use a smartphone as an authentication device for smartphone apps requiring strong authN, and a USB smartcard for everything else. Provision certificates or U-Prove tokens into these devices for authentication or transmittal of claims to various relying parties. Allow the exportation of these certificates and/or U-Prove tokens to personal computers that are frequently used for these applications, perhaps conditioned on the need for a Trusted Platform Module on the computer to house these things. So it seems I have strayed off into trying to propose a strategy for mass deployment of high assurance identity credentials for consumers under the NSTIC banner. Maybe that's a bit premature, since the final NSTIC documents haven't been released yet. But I do think that Kantara needs to consider at some point what role(s), if any, it wants to take in helping to make an Internet identity infrastructure widely adopted and usable by the masses. Bob P. --------------------------- Bob Pinheiro Chair, Consumer Identity WG 908-654-1939 kantara@bobpinheiro.com www.bobpinheiro.com On 3/16/2011 5:42 PM, Colin Wallis wrote:
Yep, fair point Rainer, regards the how SmartCards can come into play and 'connecting islands'..
It's not that we are totally averse to any PKI. We are looking at PKI-ish solution as one of a number of options for federating government agencies. But this is not customer/end user facing.
Cheers
Colin
*From:*Rainer Hörbe [mailto:rainer@hoerbe.at] *Sent:* Wednesday, 16 March 2011 8:37 p.m. *To:* Bob Pinheiro *Cc:* Colin Wallis; dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; FI WG; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara *Subject:* Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models
Bob,
SmartCards can be positioned in vertical markets, where there is a fine tuned value proposition and quality level for users and service providers, usually bundled with some "physical" benefit of the card like a customer loyalty program or physical access control. My view is that the way to better market penetration is to build these islands and then connect them using both pki and non-pki federations. I would not expect any breakthrough soon.
- Rainer
Am 16.03.2011 um 00:55 schrieb Colin Wallis:
Bob
Some interesting thoughts ..(moreso if one had decided to use smartcard technology).
FWIW, the emerging view from our program down in this little country is that end user/citizen folks want to carry another card around like a hole in the head. It would be different if we already had a sizable penetration of smartcards but we don't. However, we see many more possibilities with the ubiquitous mobile device. Those possibilities are dashed right now because the things that make identity work are hardwired into the OS with really, let's face it, no security. And, a bit like the browser vendors, I guess there is no incentive/pressure on them to change, and understandably the unit price would go up.
But wouldn't it be great to have a *separated* secure standardised TPM for things that customers carry round with them whatever they were... Bill, our lead architect uses an example of a phone, with all its usual stuff on one side and the TPM module on the back. We heard that Iron Key are going the TPM-type way, so that seems to line up with Bob's reference below. And this is getting close to our notion. But still, you want the USB to also do its usual storage functions and more too, right?
Cheers
Colin
*From:*Bob Pinheiro [mailto:kantara@bobpinheiro.com] *Sent:*Tuesday, 15 March 2011 5:43 p.m. *To:*John Bradley *Cc:*Colin Wallis;dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org>; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara *Subject:*Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models
OK, but it's still possible to use certificates for strong authentication of consumers if the certificate is contained on a USB smartcard token. Of course, relying parties must accept certificates for consumer authentication. Maybe there is a chicken-and-egg problem here: RPs may have little interest until someone shows them a strong authentication solution using certificates and smartcards that is economically viable for adoption and use by consumers. But will smartcard vendors devote resources to this until they see a consumer market?
TheSmart Card Alliance <http://www.smartcardalliance.org/>is a member of Kantara, and is also interested in getting smartcard technology into the hands of consumers. The Smart Card Alliance is represented on the Consumer Identity WG because they were hoping to get some insight into consumer interest in, and adoption of, smartcards. Unfortunately, that kind of insight doesn't exist within the Kantara community. At least not within CIWG. Yet the Smart Card Alliance has anIdentity Council <http://www.smartcardalliance.org/pages/activities-councils-identity>, so there ought to be some opportunities for collaboration between Kantara and Smart Card Alliance. There are at least two areas where our interests probably overlap: use of smartcards for access to patient health records, and smartcards as form factors for identity credentials usable within the "ecosystem" enabled by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace.
Another Kantara member is Fraunhofer FOKUS, which is the host of the next Kantara meeting, and is also a provider (?) of German eID cards. And although there seems to be no formal working relationships between Kantara and Microsoft, smartcards were used to provide secure U-Prove tokens for an RSA demo by splitting the token's private key between the user's computing device and the smartcard.
So there seems to be a number of areas of where certificates and smartcards can be used for strong authentication and/or high assurance claims. If these topics are of sufficient interest within Kantara, and resources can be found, perhaps there are opportunities for collaboration with Smart Card Alliance and others.
Bob P.
On 3/14/2011 6:25 PM, John Bradley wrote:
Colin,
I spent many years with the PKI Forum and other places pushing the better browser support rock up the hill to no great success.
There has been no detectable improvement in mutual TLS support. On the other hand EV certs got in because there was a clear revenue model to the PKI Forum participants.
Some of the problem relates to TLS itself and the rest with the browser venders.
If I had to get one thing from them it would be a way to do ephemeral keys for HoK as STORK and others have been asking for, also to no great success.
If someone wants to put together a gang to take on the browser venders I am in, but I am realistic about any real progress after 10 years or so of trying.
John B.
On 2011-03-14, at 5:56 PM, Colin Wallis wrote:
So the problem with client side Certs is the way they are implemented..with security in mind only, not privacy. 'Promiscuous' is the label given to them down here..
That's why the NZ Government does not use them in its consumer online service strategy...
And I might point out that it's too much of a generalisation for my comfort to say to that 'eGov prefers PKI' (Rainer's 5th bullet)
The lines between law enforcement/security (with no privacy) and consumer service/security (with privacy) seem to be getting blurred in some folks' minds (certainly not Bob's, nor John's..)
<<BP:For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates>>
Maybe, but I think it won't be listened to. The change has got to take place at the doors (hearts and minds) of the browser vendors, and the logical co-ordination point for that is the CA Browser forum. I'm trying to think of the directional pressure that might persuade them to tackle this problem - the Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners group? Maybe. Kantara? Nope. At least not unless KI is pushing at an open door..
Cheers
Colin
*From:*lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org>[mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org]*On Behalf Of*Bob Pinheiro *Sent:*Tuesday, 15 March 2011 6:16 a.m. *To:*John Bradley *Cc:*dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org>; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara *Subject:*Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models
Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI:
For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication?
Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2.
U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out.
Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers.
For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates?
A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove.
Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission?
Thanks
Bob P.
On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote:
I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic.
I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however.
On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote:
John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like
* PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA * To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed * Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other.
Request for feedback:
I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion?
- Rainer
<pki vs non-pki.pdf>
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==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ====_______________________________________________ LC mailing list LC@kantarainitiative.org <mailto:LC@kantarainitiative.org> http://kantarainitiative.org/mailman/listinfo/lc
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All, Will be happy to add to the mix with some things we are doing with Verizon in a day or two, but too many alligators today. Thanks Rich Furr Head Global Regulatory Affairs and Compliance New Office: 980-236-7576 Cell: 201-220-0160 From: wg-fi-bounces@kantarainitiative.org [mailto:wg-fi-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] On Behalf Of Bob Pinheiro Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 11:13 AM To: Colin Wallis; 'Rainer Hörbe'; John Bradley Cc: dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara; FI WG Subject: Re: [WG-FI] [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models For the consumer market, I agree that an obvious strong authentication device would be a mobile phone. If the phone is a smartphone, then it's also a smartcard because it incorporates a chip for processing, just like a plastic smartcard. If such a smartphone is going to be used to access online apps requiring strong authentication, then the chip could incorporate a certificate for that purpose. But if the consumer is going to access these apps on a different computer, then using the mobile phone as an authentication device isn't going to work if authentication is based on the certificate. So an alternative is to incorporate a one-time password generator, or even to use the phone to receive a one-time authorization code via SMS. But that's cumbersome IMO. If I'm going to do online banking from my laptop computer, I don't want to have to get out my cell phone and generate a OTP, then type it into the computer. Or depend on being able to receive a SMS message and then type that into the computer. So while a mobile phone may work in some situations, for others (IMO) it would be too cumbersome. For those apps, a USB device housing a certificate seems like the most secure and convenient choice. Just stick the device into the computer's USB port, enter a password, and you're good to go. For strong online authentication purposes, a USB device incorporating smartcard technology makes more sense to me than a plastic smartcard, which would require a card reader that most consumers don't have, and that would still have to be available at each computer the consumer uses. A single USB smartcard device could not only house multiple certificates for a variety of relying parties, or maybe just a single certificate trusted by multiple relying parties. It could also house an active client / claims agent to make portable a collection of long-lived U-Prove tokens. [Long-lived U-Prove tokens could transmit claims to relying parties without needing an identity provider to be available when the claims are required. This seems to be an important consideration, given that the providers of high value services may not want to shut out their customers if an identity provider is offline.] You may object and say that people don't want to carry around another device. But consider this: people already carry around a lot of keys for different things. You need a key to get into your house. Different keys for different doors, even. You need another key to start your car. You may need another key to get into your office, or to unlock your desk drawer. Carrying around a bunch of keys is something that people are used to doing. So what's the big deal about carrying around a small USB thingy to unlock all your important online stuff? That's not necessarily the argument I would use to sell the idea of USB devices as authentication devices. And a USB smartcard is probably too expensive for the mass consumer market at this time. For instance, an IronKey costs about $80 US. Maybe there are less expensive alternatives, but still, the only way this scenario would probably work is if consumers are simply given these USB smartcard devices and instructed to insert them into the computer's USB port when doing online banking, etc. But who would provide these devices to consumers, and educate them as to their use? This gets back to the biggest problem that I think is impeding the deployment of strong authN and high assurance claims for consumers.....at least in the US. There needs to be relying parties such as banks, healthcare providers, social networking sites (???) and others that want to reduce identity-related fraud through the use of high assurance claims and strong authentication, and are willing to help bankroll the deployment of strong authN to the masses. Given the right incentives, maybe different consortia would arise within different trust communities such as banking, healthcare, etc., that might distribute USB smartcards (provided the economics can be made to work). But once a consumer possesses one, he/she ought to be able to install certificates or U-Prove tokens into the device for all the different high assurance applications across these trust communities. Obviously there are going to be big issues to tackle to make such a scheme work, and not everyone may agree with my viewpoint. In Europe they seem to like plastic smartcards that require a card reader. But isn't this sort of what's being proposed by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace? Even though it is voluntary, obviously the goal is to have high adoption levels. So something like what I'm proposing seems necessary. Use a smartphone as an authentication device for smartphone apps requiring strong authN, and a USB smartcard for everything else. Provision certificates or U-Prove tokens into these devices for authentication or transmittal of claims to various relying parties. Allow the exportation of these certificates and/or U-Prove tokens to personal computers that are frequently used for these applications, perhaps conditioned on the need for a Trusted Platform Module on the computer to house these things. So it seems I have strayed off into trying to propose a strategy for mass deployment of high assurance identity credentials for consumers under the NSTIC banner. Maybe that's a bit premature, since the final NSTIC documents haven't been released yet. But I do think that Kantara needs to consider at some point what role(s), if any, it wants to take in helping to make an Internet identity infrastructure widely adopted and usable by the masses. Bob P. --------------------------- Bob Pinheiro Chair, Consumer Identity WG 908-654-1939 kantara@bobpinheiro.com<mailto:kantara@bobpinheiro.com> www.bobpinheiro.com<http://www.bobpinheiro.com> On 3/16/2011 5:42 PM, Colin Wallis wrote: Yep, fair point Rainer, regards the how SmartCards can come into play and 'connecting islands'.. It's not that we are totally averse to any PKI. We are looking at PKI-ish solution as one of a number of options for federating government agencies. But this is not customer/end user facing. Cheers Colin From: Rainer Hörbe [mailto:rainer@hoerbe.at] Sent: Wednesday, 16 March 2011 8:37 p.m. To: Bob Pinheiro Cc: Colin Wallis; dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org>; FI WG; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models Bob, SmartCards can be positioned in vertical markets, where there is a fine tuned value proposition and quality level for users and service providers, usually bundled with some "physical" benefit of the card like a customer loyalty program or physical access control. My view is that the way to better market penetration is to build these islands and then connect them using both pki and non-pki federations. I would not expect any breakthrough soon. - Rainer Am 16.03.2011 um 00:55 schrieb Colin Wallis: Bob Some interesting thoughts ..(moreso if one had decided to use smartcard technology). FWIW, the emerging view from our program down in this little country is that end user/citizen folks want to carry another card around like a hole in the head. It would be different if we already had a sizable penetration of smartcards but we don't. However, we see many more possibilities with the ubiquitous mobile device. Those possibilities are dashed right now because the things that make identity work are hardwired into the OS with really, let's face it, no security. And, a bit like the browser vendors, I guess there is no incentive/pressure on them to change, and understandably the unit price would go up. But wouldn't it be great to have a *separated* secure standardised TPM for things that customers carry round with them whatever they were... Bill, our lead architect uses an example of a phone, with all its usual stuff on one side and the TPM module on the back. We heard that Iron Key are going the TPM-type way, so that seems to line up with Bob's reference below. And this is getting close to our notion. But still, you want the USB to also do its usual storage functions and more too, right? Cheers Colin From: Bob Pinheiro [mailto:kantara@bobpinheiro.com] Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 5:43 p.m. To: John Bradley Cc: Colin Wallis; dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org>; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models OK, but it's still possible to use certificates for strong authentication of consumers if the certificate is contained on a USB smartcard token. Of course, relying parties must accept certificates for consumer authentication. Maybe there is a chicken-and-egg problem here: RPs may have little interest until someone shows them a strong authentication solution using certificates and smartcards that is economically viable for adoption and use by consumers. But will smartcard vendors devote resources to this until they see a consumer market? The Smart Card Alliance<http://www.smartcardalliance.org/> is a member of Kantara, and is also interested in getting smartcard technology into the hands of consumers. The Smart Card Alliance is represented on the Consumer Identity WG because they were hoping to get some insight into consumer interest in, and adoption of, smartcards. Unfortunately, that kind of insight doesn't exist within the Kantara community. At least not within CIWG. Yet the Smart Card Alliance has an Identity Council<http://www.smartcardalliance.org/pages/activities-councils-identity>, so there ought to be some opportunities for collaboration between Kantara and Smart Card Alliance. There are at least two areas where our interests probably overlap: use of smartcards for access to patient health records, and smartcards as form factors for identity credentials usable within the "ecosystem" enabled by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace. Another Kantara member is Fraunhofer FOKUS, which is the host of the next Kantara meeting, and is also a provider (?) of German eID cards. And although there seems to be no formal working relationships between Kantara and Microsoft, smartcards were used to provide secure U-Prove tokens for an RSA demo by splitting the token's private key between the user's computing device and the smartcard. So there seems to be a number of areas of where certificates and smartcards can be used for strong authentication and/or high assurance claims. If these topics are of sufficient interest within Kantara, and resources can be found, perhaps there are opportunities for collaboration with Smart Card Alliance and others. Bob P. On 3/14/2011 6:25 PM, John Bradley wrote: Colin, I spent many years with the PKI Forum and other places pushing the better browser support rock up the hill to no great success. There has been no detectable improvement in mutual TLS support. On the other hand EV certs got in because there was a clear revenue model to the PKI Forum participants. Some of the problem relates to TLS itself and the rest with the browser venders. If I had to get one thing from them it would be a way to do ephemeral keys for HoK as STORK and others have been asking for, also to no great success. If someone wants to put together a gang to take on the browser venders I am in, but I am realistic about any real progress after 10 years or so of trying. John B. On 2011-03-14, at 5:56 PM, Colin Wallis wrote: So the problem with client side Certs is the way they are implemented..with security in mind only, not privacy. 'Promiscuous' is the label given to them down here.. That's why the NZ Government does not use them in its consumer online service strategy... And I might point out that it's too much of a generalisation for my comfort to say to that 'eGov prefers PKI' (Rainer's 5th bullet) The lines between law enforcement/security (with no privacy) and consumer service/security (with privacy) seem to be getting blurred in some folks' minds (certainly not Bob's, nor John's..) <<BP: For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates>> Maybe, but I think it won't be listened to. The change has got to take place at the doors (hearts and minds) of the browser vendors, and the logical co-ordination point for that is the CA Browser forum. I'm trying to think of the directional pressure that might persuade them to tackle this problem - the Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners group? Maybe. Kantara? Nope. At least not unless KI is pushing at an open door.. Cheers Colin From: lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org> [mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] On Behalf Of Bob Pinheiro Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 6:16 a.m. To: John Bradley Cc: dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org>; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI: For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication? Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2. U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out. Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers. For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates? A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove. Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission? Thanks Bob P. On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote: I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic. I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however. On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote: John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like * PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA * To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed * Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other. Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion? - Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf> ==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ==== ==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ==== _______________________________________________ LC mailing list LC@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:LC@kantarainitiative.org> http://kantarainitiative.org/mailman/listinfo/lc ==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. 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Given the latest report from RSA re: new sophisticated hack on SecurID, let's remind ourselves of the importance of strong AuthN and the value it brings to the table. From: Rich Furr [mailto:rfurr@safe-biopharma.org] Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 1:00 PM To: Bob Pinheiro; Colin Wallis; 'Rainer Hörbe'; John Bradley Cc: dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; Leadership Council Kantara; FI WG; Kantara@kantarainitiative.org Subject: Re: [WG-FI] [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models All, Will be happy to add to the mix with some things we are doing with Verizon in a day or two, but too many alligators today. Thanks Rich Furr Head Global Regulatory Affairs and Compliance New Office: 980-236-7576 Cell: 201-220-0160 From: wg-fi-bounces@kantarainitiative.org [mailto:wg-fi-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] On Behalf Of Bob Pinheiro Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 11:13 AM To: Colin Wallis; 'Rainer Hörbe'; John Bradley Cc: dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara; FI WG Subject: Re: [WG-FI] [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models For the consumer market, I agree that an obvious strong authentication device would be a mobile phone. If the phone is a smartphone, then it's also a smartcard because it incorporates a chip for processing, just like a plastic smartcard. If such a smartphone is going to be used to access online apps requiring strong authentication, then the chip could incorporate a certificate for that purpose. But if the consumer is going to access these apps on a different computer, then using the mobile phone as an authentication device isn't going to work if authentication is based on the certificate. So an alternative is to incorporate a one-time password generator, or even to use the phone to receive a one-time authorization code via SMS. But that's cumbersome IMO. If I'm going to do online banking from my laptop computer, I don't want to have to get out my cell phone and generate a OTP, then type it into the computer. Or depend on being able to receive a SMS message and then type that into the computer. So while a mobile phone may work in some situations, for others (IMO) it would be too cumbersome. For those apps, a USB device housing a certificate seems like the most secure and convenient choice. Just stick the device into the computer's USB port, enter a password, and you're good to go. For strong online authentication purposes, a USB device incorporating smartcard technology makes more sense to me than a plastic smartcard, which would require a card reader that most consumers don't have, and that would still have to be available at each computer the consumer uses. A single USB smartcard device could not only house multiple certificates for a variety of relying parties, or maybe just a single certificate trusted by multiple relying parties. It could also house an active client / claims agent to make portable a collection of long-lived U-Prove tokens. [Long-lived U-Prove tokens could transmit claims to relying parties without needing an identity provider to be available when the claims are required. This seems to be an important consideration, given that the providers of high value services may not want to shut out their customers if an identity provider is offline.] You may object and say that people don't want to carry around another device. But consider this: people already carry around a lot of keys for different things. You need a key to get into your house. Different keys for different doors, even. You need another key to start your car. You may need another key to get into your office, or to unlock your desk drawer. Carrying around a bunch of keys is something that people are used to doing. So what's the big deal about carrying around a small USB thingy to unlock all your important online stuff? That's not necessarily the argument I would use to sell the idea of USB devices as authentication devices. And a USB smartcard is probably too expensive for the mass consumer market at this time. For instance, an IronKey costs about $80 US. Maybe there are less expensive alternatives, but still, the only way this scenario would probably work is if consumers are simply given these USB smartcard devices and instructed to insert them into the computer's USB port when doing online banking, etc. But who would provide these devices to consumers, and educate them as to their use? This gets back to the biggest problem that I think is impeding the deployment of strong authN and high assurance claims for consumers.....at least in the US. There needs to be relying parties such as banks, healthcare providers, social networking sites (???) and others that want to reduce identity-related fraud through the use of high assurance claims and strong authentication, and are willing to help bankroll the deployment of strong authN to the masses. Given the right incentives, maybe different consortia would arise within different trust communities such as banking, healthcare, etc., that might distribute USB smartcards (provided the economics can be made to work). But once a consumer possesses one, he/she ought to be able to install certificates or U-Prove tokens into the device for all the different high assurance applications across these trust communities. Obviously there are going to be big issues to tackle to make such a scheme work, and not everyone may agree with my viewpoint. In Europe they seem to like plastic smartcards that require a card reader. But isn't this sort of what's being proposed by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace? Even though it is voluntary, obviously the goal is to have high adoption levels. So something like what I'm proposing seems necessary. Use a smartphone as an authentication device for smartphone apps requiring strong authN, and a USB smartcard for everything else. Provision certificates or U-Prove tokens into these devices for authentication or transmittal of claims to various relying parties. Allow the exportation of these certificates and/or U-Prove tokens to personal computers that are frequently used for these applications, perhaps conditioned on the need for a Trusted Platform Module on the computer to house these things. So it seems I have strayed off into trying to propose a strategy for mass deployment of high assurance identity credentials for consumers under the NSTIC banner. Maybe that's a bit premature, since the final NSTIC documents haven't been released yet. But I do think that Kantara needs to consider at some point what role(s), if any, it wants to take in helping to make an Internet identity infrastructure widely adopted and usable by the masses. Bob P. --------------------------- Bob Pinheiro Chair, Consumer Identity WG 908-654-1939 kantara@bobpinheiro.com<mailto:kantara@bobpinheiro.com> www.bobpinheiro.com<http://www.bobpinheiro.com> On 3/16/2011 5:42 PM, Colin Wallis wrote: Yep, fair point Rainer, regards the how SmartCards can come into play and 'connecting islands'.. It's not that we are totally averse to any PKI. We are looking at PKI-ish solution as one of a number of options for federating government agencies. But this is not customer/end user facing. Cheers Colin From: Rainer Hörbe [mailto:rainer@hoerbe.at] Sent: Wednesday, 16 March 2011 8:37 p.m. To: Bob Pinheiro Cc: Colin Wallis; dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org>; FI WG; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models Bob, SmartCards can be positioned in vertical markets, where there is a fine tuned value proposition and quality level for users and service providers, usually bundled with some "physical" benefit of the card like a customer loyalty program or physical access control. My view is that the way to better market penetration is to build these islands and then connect them using both pki and non-pki federations. I would not expect any breakthrough soon. - Rainer Am 16.03.2011 um 00:55 schrieb Colin Wallis: Bob Some interesting thoughts ..(moreso if one had decided to use smartcard technology). FWIW, the emerging view from our program down in this little country is that end user/citizen folks want to carry another card around like a hole in the head. It would be different if we already had a sizable penetration of smartcards but we don't. However, we see many more possibilities with the ubiquitous mobile device. Those possibilities are dashed right now because the things that make identity work are hardwired into the OS with really, let's face it, no security. And, a bit like the browser vendors, I guess there is no incentive/pressure on them to change, and understandably the unit price would go up. But wouldn't it be great to have a *separated* secure standardised TPM for things that customers carry round with them whatever they were... Bill, our lead architect uses an example of a phone, with all its usual stuff on one side and the TPM module on the back. We heard that Iron Key are going the TPM-type way, so that seems to line up with Bob's reference below. And this is getting close to our notion. But still, you want the USB to also do its usual storage functions and more too, right? Cheers Colin From: Bob Pinheiro [mailto:kantara@bobpinheiro.com] Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 5:43 p.m. To: John Bradley Cc: Colin Wallis; dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org>; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models OK, but it's still possible to use certificates for strong authentication of consumers if the certificate is contained on a USB smartcard token. Of course, relying parties must accept certificates for consumer authentication. Maybe there is a chicken-and-egg problem here: RPs may have little interest until someone shows them a strong authentication solution using certificates and smartcards that is economically viable for adoption and use by consumers. But will smartcard vendors devote resources to this until they see a consumer market? The Smart Card Alliance<http://www.smartcardalliance.org/> is a member of Kantara, and is also interested in getting smartcard technology into the hands of consumers. The Smart Card Alliance is represented on the Consumer Identity WG because they were hoping to get some insight into consumer interest in, and adoption of, smartcards. Unfortunately, that kind of insight doesn't exist within the Kantara community. At least not within CIWG. Yet the Smart Card Alliance has an Identity Council<http://www.smartcardalliance.org/pages/activities-councils-identity>, so there ought to be some opportunities for collaboration between Kantara and Smart Card Alliance. There are at least two areas where our interests probably overlap: use of smartcards for access to patient health records, and smartcards as form factors for identity credentials usable within the "ecosystem" enabled by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace. Another Kantara member is Fraunhofer FOKUS, which is the host of the next Kantara meeting, and is also a provider (?) of German eID cards. And although there seems to be no formal working relationships between Kantara and Microsoft, smartcards were used to provide secure U-Prove tokens for an RSA demo by splitting the token's private key between the user's computing device and the smartcard. So there seems to be a number of areas of where certificates and smartcards can be used for strong authentication and/or high assurance claims. If these topics are of sufficient interest within Kantara, and resources can be found, perhaps there are opportunities for collaboration with Smart Card Alliance and others. Bob P. On 3/14/2011 6:25 PM, John Bradley wrote: Colin, I spent many years with the PKI Forum and other places pushing the better browser support rock up the hill to no great success. There has been no detectable improvement in mutual TLS support. On the other hand EV certs got in because there was a clear revenue model to the PKI Forum participants. Some of the problem relates to TLS itself and the rest with the browser venders. If I had to get one thing from them it would be a way to do ephemeral keys for HoK as STORK and others have been asking for, also to no great success. If someone wants to put together a gang to take on the browser venders I am in, but I am realistic about any real progress after 10 years or so of trying. John B. On 2011-03-14, at 5:56 PM, Colin Wallis wrote: So the problem with client side Certs is the way they are implemented..with security in mind only, not privacy. 'Promiscuous' is the label given to them down here.. That's why the NZ Government does not use them in its consumer online service strategy... And I might point out that it's too much of a generalisation for my comfort to say to that 'eGov prefers PKI' (Rainer's 5th bullet) The lines between law enforcement/security (with no privacy) and consumer service/security (with privacy) seem to be getting blurred in some folks' minds (certainly not Bob's, nor John's..) <<BP: For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates>> Maybe, but I think it won't be listened to. The change has got to take place at the doors (hearts and minds) of the browser vendors, and the logical co-ordination point for that is the CA Browser forum. I'm trying to think of the directional pressure that might persuade them to tackle this problem - the Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners group? Maybe. Kantara? Nope. At least not unless KI is pushing at an open door.. Cheers Colin From: lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org> [mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] On Behalf Of Bob Pinheiro Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 6:16 a.m. To: John Bradley Cc: dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org>; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI: For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication? Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2. U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out. Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers. For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates? A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove. Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission? Thanks Bob P. On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote: I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic. I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however. On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote: John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like * PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA * To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed * Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other. Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion? - Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf> ==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ==== ==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ==== _______________________________________________ LC mailing list LC@kantarainitiative.org<mailto:LC@kantarainitiative.org> http://kantarainitiative.org/mailman/listinfo/lc ==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. 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Am 14.03.2011 um 22:56 schrieb Colin Wallis:
So the problem with client side Certs is the way they are implemented..with security in mind only, not privacy. 'Promiscuous' is the label given to them down here..
That's why the NZ Government does not use them in its consumer online service strategy…
And I might point out that it's too much of a generalisation for my comfort to say to that 'eGov prefers PKI' (Rainer's 5th bullet)
You are right, I mixed subject and provider certificates. What I actually meant is: Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust for IdP and RPs, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other. Rainer
The lines between law enforcement/security (with no privacy) and consumer service/security (with privacy) seem to be getting blurred in some folks' minds (certainly not Bob's, nor John's..)
<<BP: For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates>>
Maybe, but I think it won't be listened to. The change has got to take place at the doors (hearts and minds) of the browser vendors, and the logical co-ordination point for that is the CA Browser forum. I'm trying to think of the directional pressure that might persuade them to tackle this problem - the Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners group? Maybe. Kantara? Nope. At least not unless KI is pushing at an open door..
Cheers Colin
From: lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org [mailto:lc-bounces@kantarainitiative.org] On Behalf Of Bob Pinheiro Sent: Tuesday, 15 March 2011 6:16 a.m. To: John Bradley Cc: dg-bctf@kantarainitiative.org; FI WG; Curry Patrick; Kantara Leadership Council Kantara Subject: Re: [KI-LC] PKI vs Non-PKI based trust models
Regarding U-Prove and failed efforts at consumer PKI:
For high assurance consumer applications that (should) require strong authentication, such as online banking, payments, access to patient health records and other sensitive personal information, what are the possibilities for doing strong authentication?
Since PKI doesn't seem to be a realistic possibility at the consumer level (at least not now), it seems that the current choice is limited to one-time passwords, at least for consistency with IAF and NIST 800-63 v1.0.2.
U-Prove tokens are a potentially viable method for transmitting high assurance claims to a RP for these consumer apps. But even so, the consumer will still need to strongly authenticate to either an identity provider (who issues the tokens), or to a cloud-based active client / token agent / claims agent. Or both (??). With the demise of Cardspace, the use of a self-issued infocard for performing this authentication seems to be out.
Joni has asked for volunteers for a strategy subcommittee to help Kantara become more effective, attract more members, etc. I'm wondering whether one possible strategic goal for Kantara could be to help transform PKI into something that is practical for use by consumers.
For example, could Kantara have a role to play in making it practical to provision client-side certificates to consumers, so that websites can enable the use of two-way SSL for consumers who have client-side certificates?
A second possible strategic direction is to help in getting U-Prove to be implemented in a way that is usable by consumers. There is a related effort in the form of a claims agent working group in Identity Commons, but that is not specific to U-Prove.
Maybe these thoughts are best discussed in the strategy subcommittee instead, but I just wanted to put this out there and get some sense as to whether anyone thinks these might be reasonable goals to pursue. Or not? Would such goals stray too far from Kantara's mission?
Thanks
Bob P.
On 3/14/2011 10:50 AM, John Bradley wrote: I helped start Xcert software (now RSA KeyOn) 12 years ago to work on federated identity issues using PKI client Auth. Why PKI failed in the consumer/internet space is a big topic. I should also mention that u-prove (zero knowledge prrof) cryptography contains elements of both certificates and assertions. I have limited expectations for any short term traction on that however.
On 2011-03-14, at 8:08 AM, Rainer Hörbe wrote:
John, Patrick and I had a discussion about the pros and cons of federation models based on credentials versus assertions. The attached document is a preliminary result with conclusions like PKI and non-PKI federation models need to be combined in most cases at higher LoA To implement a federation an RFC 3647-style policy is insufficient; A more complete Trust Framework is needed Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other.
Request for feedback: I wonder where this discussion should be homed. FIWG, BCTF and TFMM are related, and it is also an extrakantarian issue. Any interest to take over this discussion?
- Rainer <pki vs non-pki.pdf>
==== CAUTION: This email message and any attachments contain information that may be confidential and may be LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. If you are not the intended recipient, any use, disclosure or copying of this message or attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email message in error please notify us immediately and erase all copies of the message and attachments. Thank you. ==== _______________________________________________ LC mailing list LC@kantarainitiative.org http://kantarainitiative.org/mailman/listinfo/lc
You are right, I mixed subject and provider certificates. What I actually meant is:
* Whereas the Higher Education sector favors brokered trust for IdP and RPs, e-Government and Industry prefer the PKI approach. But it is not a question of one way or the other.
When there's an actual profile of how SAML trust management and PKI work together, then I will accept that it's an on-par solution. Until then, one of these approaches is well-defined and interoperable and the other isn't. -- Scott
Canada is working on that profile. The FICAM profiel of how PKI and SAML work together uses federation meta data so that the commercial IdP don't all have to use certificates issued from a single CA. As inter federation becomes more complex using meta-data allows IdP top participate in multiple federations without having to set up separate endpoints with different signing certificates for each federation. Both work, and are relatively well understood. There are problems with SAML products not performing path validation, and understanding extensions and polices that The Canadian profile is attempting to address. The problem is that what you want for PKI trust management in SAML is more complicated than what people do for SSL. So the products tend to only have basic path walking to a certificate store and perhaps OCSP. Some people will say that the current state of PKI in SAML only gives the illusion of security, and is not scaleable or flexible. To get it to work at all people devolve to doing direct key comparisons of certificates manually configured into there software, so in many ways they jus ignore the PKI features with the possible exception of someone possibly checking it on import. We are looking at producing a paper to better explain the meta-data option. It uses Asymmetric signatures but not the PKIX trust hierarchy. The FICAM SAML 2.0 WEB SSO profile has a fair amount of information. There is a outstanding issue of what the Federation operator uses to sign the meta-data for inter federation. However that is mostly a issue at the Federation operator level. I expect that there will be one or more CA with CPS for issuing high trust certificates for non-person entities to sign federation meta-data with. At our current scale it is mostly a theoretical issue. Pairwise federation agreements will go a long way. John B. On 2011-03-15, at 5:48 PM, Bucci, Debbie (NIH/CIT) [E] wrote:
"...actual profile of how SAML trust management and PKI work together ..."
Maybe it's time to create one
-- Deb _______________________________________________ WG-FI mailing list WG-FI@kantarainitiative.org http://kantarainitiative.org/mailman/listinfo/wg-fi
participants (9)
-
Alterman, Peter (NIH/CIT) [E] -
Bob Pinheiro -
Bucci, Debbie (NIH/CIT) [E] -
Cantor, Scott E. -
Colin Wallis -
Fulup Ar Foll Oracle -
Iain Henderson -
John Bradley -
Patrick Harding -
Rainer Hörbe -
Rich Furr