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Potential category of use case
by John Wunderlich 03 Aug '16

03 Aug '16

Hi; The article linked to below suggested to me one category of problem that we could consider for blockchains. It seems to me that in a generic sense blockchain technology is technology in the service of governance and transparency. And further, since Kantara is all about identity, the category of problem that the report may choose to focus or include is how can we design/build/implement IBCT's (newly identified acronym: Identity Block Chain Technologies) that have the following characteristics: 1. Facilitates appropriate levels of identity proof (only need to prove of age at a liquor store, but will need strong proof that I'm the full natural person when voting). 2. Provide aggregate transparency and reporting so that anyone - citizen or government - can see where and what kinds of identity proofs are being used by the government. 3. Provides individual privacy protection and audit capability. I can audit who has looked at my identity information and in what context, but I CANNOT do that for any other person. I'm not fully immersed in the blockchain hype machine, but I'm fully aware that all this and more (but wait...) has been promised by block chain evangelists, but I'm not sure how seriously to take some or all of that. Linked article: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2016/0729/Opinion-H… Sincerely, John Wunderlich @PrivacyCDN Call: +1 (647) 669-4749 eMail: john(a)wunderlich.ca -- This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify the system manager. This message contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this e-mail. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail if you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail from your system. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.

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Starting a BTC/ETH Company
by Rainer Hoerbe 03 Aug '16

03 Aug '16

Nice overview about breakdown/collapse of various products: https://magoo.github.io/Blockchain-Graveyard/ - Rainer

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Notes from BSC telecon Tuesday August 2
by Eve Maler 02 Aug '16

02 Aug '16

http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/2016-08+%28August+2016%… Agenda: - Work on "Trust and verification in a health research context" (was: Alice Consents to Health Research) and discuss implications for technologies sections in the report Attending: Eve, Jeff S, Andrew, Thomas, John W, Matisse, Scott S, Jim, Adam, Domenico, John M, Colin "L" The new title is a working title. And...now it's Alice participates in Bob's Research Study <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/Alice+participates+in+B…> ! There's a bifurcation of PHI for healthcare and PHI for health research. The biggest question: Is there a role for the blockchain? The three lightbulbs highlight the particular steps where this comes into play. Thomas notes there is a bit of a crisis of repeatability in research. Could that be addressed with the new technologies somehow? John suspects that this is where putting the protocols (the descriptions of the studies) themselves on the blockchain would be more productive, and this is where his mention of a "predecessor or stereotypical case" of Human Research Consent could encompass that solution. He points to https://clinicaltrials.gov. John M has written up a use case on his blog that leverages the blockchain for blinded (lightly deidentified) identity, not for the consent per se, in a research context. Jeff comments that if hashing for pseudonymity is being suggested (yes), then the entire suite of technologies that constitute "blockchain" may not be needed. One theme of blockchain application, therefore, is "identity proving". Another that we started with was "agreement proving" ?? So: Do we have use case bundles that are related, and can we write them quickly and with their relatedness exposed? (whether that relation is hierarchy, mind map, or whatever) It appears so, yes. Does it make sense to think of problems blockchain purports to solve, in specific, as things like "proving identity", "proving of agreement status" (e.g. whether consent has currently been given) – or "proving an event"? (suggested in the chat), and "proving that conditions have been met" (smart contracts)? Eve will reach out to Bart Suichies' erstwhile colleagues at the Philips Blockchain Lab to see if they have someone interested to join. There's no doubt that today's notes are incomplete or – gasp! – even wrong in spots. Please correct in followup email. *Eve Maler*ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl *ForgeRock Summits and UnSummits* are coming to <http://summits.forgerock.com/> *Sydney, London, and Paris!*

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New BSC use-case: Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing on Blockchain P2P Nodes
by Thomas Hardjono 02 Aug '16

02 Aug '16

Folks, Below is a new BSC use-case I'm championing. Its a first sketch (I'll be revising/improving it). Best. /thomas/ ---------------------------------------------------- Name of use case: Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing on Blockchain P2P Nodes Description: Instead of a centralized data processing architecture, the P2P nodes (e.g. in a blockchain) offers the opportunity for data (user data and organizational data) to be stored by these nodes and be processed in a privacy-preserving manner. In this new paradigm of privacy-preserving data sharing, we “move the algorithm to the data” where queries and subqueries are computed by the data repositories (nodes on the P2P network). This means that repositories never release raw data and that they perform the algorithm/query computation locally which produce aggregate answers only. This approach of moving the algorithm to the data provides data-owners and other joint rights-holders the opportunity to exercise control over data release, and thus offers a way forward to provide the highest degree of privacy-preservation while allowing data to still be effectively shared. This paradigm requires that queries be decomposed into one or more subqueries, where each subquery is sent to the appropriate data repository (nodes on the P2P network) and be executed at that repository. This allows each data repository to evaluate received subqueries in terms of “safety” from a privacy and data leakage perspective. Furthermore, safe queries and subqueries can be expressed in the form of a query smart contract (QSC) that legally bind the querier (person or organization), the data repository and other related entities. A query smart contract has been vetted to be safe can even be stored on nodes of the P2P network (e.g. blockchain). This allows Queriers to not only search for useful data (as advertised by the metadata in the repositories) but also search for prefabricated safe QSCs that are available throughout the P2P network that match the intended application. Such a query smart contract will require that identities and authorizations requirements be encoded within the contract. A node on the P2P network may act as a Delegate Node in the completion of a subquery smart contract. A delegate node works on a subquery by locating the relevant data repositories, sending the appropriate subquery to each data repository, and receiving individual answers and collating the results received from these data repositories for reporting to the (paying) Querier. A Delegate Node that seeks to fulfil a query smart contract should only do so when all the conditions of the contract has been fulfilled (e.g. QSC has valid signature; identity of Querier is established; authorization to access APIs at data repositories has been obtained; payment terms has been agreed, etc.). A hierarchy of delegate nodes may be involved in the completion of a given query originating from the Querier entity. The remuneration scheme for all Delegate Nodes and the data repositories involved in a query is outside the scope of the current use-case. Champion: Thomas Hardjono Actors: (a) Data repository node: The role of the data repositories to hold raw-data and perform privacy-preserving “safe” query/subquery computations. (b) Querier: This is the entity that seeks to run a query over data that are distributed across multiple data-repositories. (c) QSC node: These are the nodes that store a signed copy of a query smart contract. (d) Delegate Node: This is a node on the P2P network that seek to complete a subquery smart contract. ----------------------------------------------------

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IAPP views of blockchain
by Rainer Hoerbe 02 Aug '16

02 Aug '16

> Am 28.07.2016 um 21:00 schrieb Patrick Curry <patrick.curry(a)bbfa.info <mailto:patrick.curry@bbfa.info>>: > > Bitcoin > Society is very confused about Bitcoin, and whether it is good or bad. > Bitcoin benefitted from first mover advantage, but it suffers from the historic inevitability that any economic system without adequate governance will collapse when those that can, abuse others too much. Hence the drive to introduce much more governance into cryptocurrencies and have suitable mechanisms in the underlying block chains. Practically, some of the banks have been looking at how to establish “trusted Bitcoin” i.e. to put a cryptographically bound wrapper around the Bitcoin transaction and the provenance/traceability trail, which would more normally be met in a permissioned chain. The lack of governance can also be seen as a feature of blockchains. Other distributed, non-hierarchical systems (e.g. PGP web-of-trust, BGP routing) did not collapse and managed to restrict abuse (at the expense of scalability). It is also worth to consider that Satoshi's primary intent was to solve the double spending problem in a fully distributed system, which Bitcoin, even considering its inefficiencies, does solve quite well. It is without governance by design. It lets many different users agree on the current state of the blockchain even though they don't trust each other or any central authority. This problem had remained unsolved until the Bitcoin network was launched. OTOH, as the recent Ethereum fork (to mitigate the DAO breach) showed, having a major decision being made by a ad-hoc structured community of developers reaching out to stakeholders by questionnaires appears scary. However, just adding adequate governance is difficult for such a system. Having a centrally controlled consensus algorithm or introduce gated access might contradict fundamental properties. I would be curious to learn which approaches lead to better governance without discarding the fundamental properties of the block chain. - Rainer Hörbe

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IAPP views of blockchain
by John Wunderlich 01 Aug '16

01 Aug '16

The IAPP (International Association of Privacy Professionals) has published a number of small pieces for privacy professionals about blockchain on its web site and newsletters. I've attached a representative sample for your edification Sincerely, John Wunderlich @PrivacyCDN Call: +1 (647) 669-4749 eMail: john(a)wunderlich.ca -- This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify the system manager. This message contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this e-mail. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail if you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail from your system. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.

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Agenda for BSC telecon Tuesday August 2
by Eve Maler 01 Aug '16

01 Aug '16

http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/2016-08+%28August+2016%… We meet *Tuesdays* for 30 minutes at 7:30am PT / 10:30am ET / 3:30pm UK / 4:30pm CET. We use Kantara Line A (US +1-805-309-2350, Skype +99051000000481, international options <https://www.turbobridge.com/international.html>, web interface <https://panel.turbobridge.com/webcall/>, more info <https://www.turbobridge.com/join.html>, code 4022737) and http://join.me/findthomas for screen sharing. See the DG calendar <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/Calendar> for our full meeting schedule. Agenda: - Work on Trust and verification in a health research context <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/Trust+and+verification+…> (was: Alice Consents to Health Research) and discuss implications for technologies sections in the report *Eve Maler*ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl *ForgeRock Summits and UnSummits* are coming to <http://summits.forgerock.com/> *Sydney, London, and Paris!*

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Use Case updated
by John Wunderlich 31 Jul '16

31 Jul '16

I've renamed the use case and put in a basic narrative and use case diagram. I've tried to put forward the simplest case. Please review and comment if you have a chance, before I move on and fill in the rest of the use case. http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/Trust+and+verification+… Sincerely, John Wunderlich @PrivacyCDN Call: +1 (647) 669-4749 eMail: john(a)wunderlich.ca -- This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify the system manager. This message contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this e-mail. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail if you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail from your system. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.

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Re: [DG-BSC] Use Case updated
by j stollman 31 Jul '16

31 Jul '16

John, It is reassuring that we share sensitivity to the issues researchers would face if they had to individualize consents to meet each patient's unique requirements. We appear to part ways (at least for purposes of this discussion) on the best ways to compose and memorialize medical research consents. Regarding consent composition, perhaps, it is best addressed by developing a few model consents that afford different levels of control to data subjects. In this way, review boards might then challenge researchers on why they didn't use the model with the most user control and the researcher would be obliged to justify his selection from among the models. I don't know that allowing subjects full ability to tailor their consent won't raise the objections you cite of sample size and cost. And I don't know that giving subjects such power has much impact on the doctor who recommends participation in the wrong study for the wrong reasons. Regarding memorializing the consents, I could be persuaded that merely giving a subject a copy of a signed consent may be too burdensome on the subject. Storing and tracking the document (in hard copy of digital form) is such a rare event for most subject that they are unlikely to have a good system for doing so that allows for ready retrieval when an issue arises. But I also suspect that adding such a consent to a blockchain may be unnecessarily costly. It could just as easily be stored in a standard database by some independent administrator of such research consents that would operated like a library. The funding for the administrator could come from the same source as funding for a blockchain. I also suspect that giving individuals additional consent opportunities with regard to re-use of research in which they were a subject could dramatically reduce the opportunity to re-use the data. If a large study has 10,000 subjects and the data from it could be used for another study, the new researchers have merely to show that their reuse is consistent with the original consent. If they have to go to each subject to obtain a new, separate consent, the database could well become unusable. Subjects may have new addresses (physical or digital) and tracking them down too costly. I had a similar experience when I wrote a musical several years ago. The entire point of the musical was to re-use existing rock songs that told a story. I assumed that a theater could just pay ASCAP or BMI their licensing fees and be free to have the songs performed in the context of the musical. Not so. Bands can play copyrighted songs under ASCAP and BMI. But a musical requires obtaining unique consent from every publisher. No theater would consider my musical until I first obtained consent from each publisher. I began contacting the publishers. After a few replies such as, "Mr. Morrison needs to know how many seats are in the theater and what is the price per seat," I abandoned the effort. I see individualized consents causing the same problem. I suppose it could be argued that if we can't obtain such individualized consents, perhaps the research is not in the public interest. Perhaps that current practices is tilted too strongly towards the researchers. But I would not want to be the spokesperson representing individualized consents -- even though I am a strong adherent of the rights of the individual. Jef --------------------------------- Jeff Stollman stollman.j(a)gmail.com 1 202.683.8699 Truth never triumphs — its opponents just die out. Science advances one funeral at a time. Max Planck On Sat, Jul 30, 2016 at 10:13 PM, John Wunderlich <john(a)wunderlich.ca> wrote: > Jeff; > > I’ll not disagree that at first blush the value add for smart contracts > and blockchain doesn’t leap off the page. You may recall me trying to argue > against a health research/consent use case in the DG. That being said, the > basic use case can be used throughout Kantara - once elaborated and > validated since there is a lot of work in Kantara that could touch health > research. > > I agree with your assessment of how clinical trials and the YES/NO > decision is made. From sitting on REBs I believe that a study sponsor, > especially in an RCT (randomized controlled trial) literally can’t let in > too much variability how subjects participate in a drug trial. It would > essentially add another independent variable and balloon the sample size > and cost requirements. > > But here’s the issue arising out of that that may make this worth > addressing. Public ledgers can be tools for better governance and > transparency to address power imbalances between the information ‘elites’ > and the information ‘masses’. And I don’t there that there is an imbalance > greater that between a patient that has just been told that the 5 year > survival rate for Stage 3 exocrine pancreatic cancer is 3% (ref. here > <http://www.cancer.org/cancer/pancreaticcancer/detailedguide/pancreatic-canc…>) > and the doctor that is offering an ‘experimental treatment’. How meaningful > is consent (which is supposed to be ‘free of coercion’ and ‘informed’) at > this point? The circumstances are inherently coercive. This is not to blame > the study team or the doctor. It is what it is. > > The vast majority, but not all physicians and researchers will make the > best choices they can in what they believe to be the patient’s best > interests. But even then, once consent has been obtained, some researchers > see data as proprietary and something over which the patient has no right > to a say. (After all, do rocks have any rights to seismological data?) > Consents are often written to enable that proprietary view, and some > countries’ laws agree. Research ethics boards are generally self policing, > with some governance, and some lay input. But the fact remains that they > are mainly researchers approving other researchers’ work. Quis custodiet > ipsos custodes? > > If it is the case that a doctor recommends certain studies over others > based on bad medical judgement, or her relationship with the investigators, > or for rewards and recognition (either academic or cash) what tools can a > patient or her estate use? A public ledger could protect patient privacy > and still provide regulators, auditors and investigators something more to > go on that self reports from the investigated. But until such tools are > available, it is hard to advocate for them. > > As an aside I would argue that consent receipts, if developed and > implemented create a whole new potential for consent based big data type > recruitment and data mining (thinking of thinks like some of the studies > that the Apple Health Kit is starting to make possible). These would be > voluntary, so the consent would be real, and real benefits could accrue > from such large scale studies. More robust and accurate wearable hardware > and software could have large implications, but not for drug trials. > > > > > Sincerely, > John Wunderlich > @PrivacyCDN > > Call: +1 (647) 669-4749 > eMail: john(a)wunderlich.ca > > On 30 July 2016 at 16:52, j stollman <stollman.j(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >> John, et al, >> >> I agree that this is a real-world use case. But I am not certain how >> blockchain has much value add. Perhaps I am too rigid in my thinking, but >> I see this as a classic example of a use case that is well served by >> consent consent processes. >> >> If I were conducting a clinical trial, I will need consent from all >> participants. But consent will be on my terms and will be a YES/NO >> decision. Ideally, it would be nice to allow some give and take and allow >> for customized consents for each user. But practically speaking this could >> become a management nightmare and there is likely too much risk in >> violating HIPAA for researchers to tolerate anything beyond a traditional >> consent. Why couldn't this just be stored in a file cabinet. >> >> If, subsequent to the consent, another researcher desires to re-purpose >> data developed in the first clinical trial, the new researcher would have >> to obtain separate consents from the users, unless the original consent >> included consent for using subject data to support other research efforts. >> >> Am I missing something? >> >> If not, what benefit do we expect to get from using the blockchain to >> track this simple logging of consent receipts? >> >> Thank you. >> >> Jeff >> >> >> --------------------------------- >> Jeff Stollman >> stollman.j(a)gmail.com >> 1 202.683.8699 >> >> Truth never triumphs — its opponents just die out. >> Science advances one funeral at a time. >> Max Planck >> >> On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 3:45 PM, John Wunderlich <john(a)wunderlich.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> I've renamed the use case and put in a basic narrative and use case >>> diagram. I've tried to put forward the simplest case. Please review and >>> comment if you have a chance, before I move on and fill in the rest of the >>> use case. >>> >>> >>> http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/BSC/Trust+and+verification+… >>> >>> >>> Sincerely, >>> John Wunderlich >>> @PrivacyCDN >>> >>> Call: +1 (647) 669-4749 >>> eMail: john(a)wunderlich.ca >>> >>> >>> This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and >>> intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are >>> addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify the >>> system manager. This message contains confidential information and is >>> intended only for the individual named. If you are not the named addressee >>> you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this e-mail. Please notify >>> the sender immediately by e-mail if you have received this e-mail by >>> mistake and delete this e-mail from your system. If you are not the >>> intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing >>> or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is >>> strictly prohibited. >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> DG-BSC mailing list >>> DG-BSC(a)kantarainitiative.org >>> http://kantarainitiative.org/mailman/listinfo/dg-bsc >>> >>> >> > > > This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended > solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. > If you have received this email in error please notify the system manager. > This message contains confidential information and is intended only for the > individual named. If you are not the named addressee you should not > disseminate, distribute or copy this e-mail. Please notify the sender > immediately by e-mail if you have received this e-mail by mistake and > delete this e-mail from your system. If you are not the intended recipient > you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any > action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly > prohibited. >

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Where blockchain COULD BE used
by Salvatore D'Agostino 29 Jul '16

29 Jul '16

https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/industries-disrupted-blockchain/?utm_source= CB+Insights+Newsletter <https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/industries-disrupted-blockchain/?utm_source =CB+Insights+Newsletter&utm_campaign=ec0d61b746-ThursNL_7_28_2016&utm_medium =email&utm_term=0_9dc0513989-ec0d61b746-86864785> &utm_campaign=ec0d61b746-ThursNL_7_28_2016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9dc05 13989-ec0d61b746-86864785 Salvatore D'Agostino IDmachines LLC 1264 Beacon Street, #5 Brookline, MA 02446 USA http://www.idmachines.com <http://www.idmachines.com/> http://idmachines.blogspot.com <http://idmachines.blogspot.com/> @idmachines +1 617.201.4809 ph +1 617.812.6495 fax

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